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Professor Walter A. McDougall’s recent, well-received histories of the 
United States confirm that the tried and true survival technique for individuals 
and businesses in America’s roiling, competitive economy has traditionally 
been personal and institutional responsiveness to the needs and desires of 
customers and clients.1  The early characterizations of the United States’ drive 
to succeed in business demonstrate that the country’s no-nonsense and 
occasionally grasping quest for wealth, success, and distinction typically 
accompanied fiscal advancement and success.2  Hence, McDougall’s history 
                                                            
 1. See, e.g., WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, FREEDOM JUST AROUND THE CORNER: A NEW 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1585–1828, at 7 (2004) (pointing out that Americans have often been 
flatteringly described as “builders, doers, go-getters, dreamers, hard workers, inventors, [and] 
organizers,” but the same traits have their dark side and have prompted unflattering descriptions 
such as “self-promoters, scofflaws, [and] occasional frauds”).  To be sure, McDougall 
acknowledged that America’s commercial culture was largely a transplant of English commercial 
savvy and developed over centuries of growth and trade.  See id. at 5 (noting that Americans 
“have enjoyed more opportunity to pursue their ambitions .  .  . than any other people in history”); 
see also id. at 30–31 (describing the English maritime trade and commercial growth of the 
sixteenth century); STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 62–64 (2009) 
(summarizing recent historical scholarship on the dynamism and rapid growth in the  
late seventeenth-century English economy, particularly in its booming overseas—especially 
Atlantic—trade). 
 2. See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THROES OF DEMOCRACY: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
ERA, 1829–1877, at 37 (2008) (recounting Philip Schaff’s description of the American character, 
which stated that “[t]he best advice he could give aspiring emigrants was the adage ‘Pray and 
work,’ . . . [because] just as genuine Americans despised idleness, so did they consider monetary 
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suggests that America has pulled itself out of historical slumps by 
reinvigorating its traditional economic drive,3 renewing the national desire to 
succeed in all endeavors, and overcoming all challenges and competitors.4  
Indeed, one American studies professor has observed that national concerns 
about school quality tend to intensify whenever the American “economy 
appears to face a foreign threat.”5 
This Article directs these quality concerns to the current system in most of 
the nation’s law schools.  First, this Article discusses the increasing 
competition among law firms and the corresponding increase in firms’ 
demands of its new associates.  Specifically, this Article points out the need for 
competent new lawyers who can think and write critically, and the noted lack 
of such skills in modern law-school graduates.  Second, this Article comments 
on faculties’ decreased expectations of law students and the high time 
preference among modern law students, which culminates in law-school 
graduates being unable to meet the demands of the contemporary firm 
                                                                                                                                         
gain a chance ‘to do good’”).  The American character trait of a desire to prosper was so  
well-established by the late eighteenth century that some Americans proffered the trait as a reason 
to dissent from the republican fervor that made self-denying civic virtue the sine qua non for the 
establishment of a successful republic.  JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF 
THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 178 (2010).  For example, Carter Braxton, a delegate from Virginia 
to the Continental Congress, became convinced by 1776 that Americans were so eager to get 
ahead and enjoy a life of pleasant consumption that they were too materialistic and self-interested 
“to play the ascetic Spartan role that strict republican theory assigned them.”  Id.  In short, 
America has been a commercial republic since its beginning.  See MCDOUGALL, supra, at 7; see 
also Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1933, 1952 (2001). 
 3. See, e.g., MCDOUGALL, supra note 2, at 68 (noting the rapid recovery from the Panic of 
1819); id. at 560, 748 n.71 (describing the establishment of huge business cartels and 
concentrated industries on the ruins of firms bankrupted by the Panic of 1873); id. at 515–16 
(explaining that 50,000 settlers poured into Nebraska after territorial organization in 1855 and 
that despite the Panic of 1857, the vast majority of the settlers, as a local Baptist minister 
explained, “‘seemed in a terrible hurry to . . . push their various enterprises to success and 
wealth’”). 
 4. See America’s Future, ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, at 13 (“[I]t is the relentless 
competition of clever new firms from Portland to Pittsburgh that will pull the country out of its 
current [economic] gloom.”). 
 5. Andrew Delbanco, Dreams of Better Schools, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 19, 2009, at 27, 
27 n.1.  For example, after the shock of the U.S.S.R.’s Sputnik launch in 1957, a frenzied 
emphasis on mathematics and science instruction arose in the United States as a response to the 
fear that the Soviets had surpassed the country in science education.  Id.  The Japanese incursion 
into the preserve of American automobile companies in the 1970s and 1980s prompted similar 
consternation.  Id.  As the United States experiences another bout of intensified foreign economic 
pressure, there are once again calls for better education and training as the competitive cure.  See 
Amanda Harmon Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit Colleges and 
Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer Responsibility in 
Higher Education, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505, 505 (2009) (“It is clear that the twenty-first 
century economy requires workers to seek more education and innovation to be competitive in the 
global marketplace.”). 
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environment.  In particular, the abundance of easy law-school courses, 
administrators’ reliance on student evaluations of professors, and the 
disappearance of the Socratic method in law-school classrooms contribute to a 
system that produces poorly prepared law school graduates.  Next, this Article 
examines the need for a revamped law school curriculum and traces the 
historical role of rhetoric in legal teaching.  This Article rejects the notion that 
law schools should teach rhetoric as a separate first-year course, but rather 
emphasizes the need to teach first-year law students rhetoric in their core 
substantive courses.  The Iowa model offers an example of this integrated 
approach to teaching legal analysis and writing.  Finally, the Article details the 
benefits and logistics of such a teaching model and concludes with a 
comparison between the Iowa model and the standard legal research and 
writing programs in most contemporary law schools. 
I.  LAW FIRMS GO BOTTOM LINE 
In response to the economic stagflation of the 1970s,6 American law firms 
began shifting away from operating like comfortably prosperous public 
utilities7 and instead started focusing on the elementary requirements for 
successful competition.8  Specifically, firms have attended to supply and 
demand and the bottom-line necessity of satisfying clients by outperforming 
competitors in both price and quality.9  Not surprisingly, novice  
associates—recent graduates who earned their law degree and passed their 
state’s licensing examinations—feel the demands attendant to the new 
                                                            
 6. See BRIAN DOMITROVIC, ECONOCLASTS: THE REBELS WHO SPARKED THE  
SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION AND RESTORED AMERICAN PROSPERITY 4–7 (2009) (providing an 
introduction to the economic turmoil of the 1970s, known as the “stagflation decade”). 
 7. Susan Raridon Lambreth, The Changing Educational Needs of the American Lawyer, 
CLE J., Oct. 2005, at 1, 1. 
 8. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance 
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1991) (noting that in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, law practice moved “toward commercialization,” with “an 
emphasis on money and profit rather than on service and justice”); Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law 
Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L. REV. 667, 674–77 (2005) (noting the shift toward 
competition in law practice); David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competencies: Innovation in 
Legal Education, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2009) (“The legal profession . . . has become 
far more of a competitive business and far less of a traditional guild.”). 
 9. See Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the Research 
University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1979–80 
(1999) (observing the shift toward specialization of law practice); Lambreth, supra note 7, at  
1–3 (describing the increase of competition among firms, the commoditization of legal services, 
and changes in clients’ legal needs as contributing to the transformation of the legal profession); 
Lloyd, supra note 8, at 676–77 (noting that the competition for clients has increased firms’ 
expectations of new associates); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical 
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 899–900 
(1999) (“The market for lawyers’ services has become intensely competitive.  As the number of 
lawyers has soared, competition for clients has become ferocious.”). 
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economic competitiveness of law firms.10  These associates are the 
downstream recipients of the pressure that demanding clients and eager 
competitors place on modern law firms.11  These pressures have only 
intensified in recent years following the economic downturn that began in 
2008.12  The dismal hiring prospects at most law firms suggest that there will 
likely be a buyer’s market for years to come;13 therefore, contemporary law 
graduates must acquire a certain level of skill during law school in order to 
become or to remain law firm associates.14  At one point in time, students who 
graduated from law school without learning to think and write proficiently 
were able to get jobs, but those pleasant days are over, possibly forever. 
II.  LAW FIRM DEMANDS OF NEW LAWYERS GO UP 
Contemporary law schools have, in general, failed to grasp, much less 
embrace, the notion that they are preparing future lawyers to enter the legal 
                                                            
 10. See Lloyd, supra note 8, at 677 (discussing firms’ expectations of their new associates 
in an age of intense competition). 
 11. See id.; see also Van Zandt, supra note 8, at 1129 (stating that increasingly demanding 
clients have loaded greater pressures upon new attorneys). 
 12. See Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even at Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
26, 2009, at B1 (describing the recession’s effects on law firms); see also Joyce S. Sterling  
& Nancy Reichman, So, You Want to Be a Lawyer? The Quest for Professional Status in a 
Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2289 (2010) (“The financial crisis has meant 
less work, leading more and more lawyers to become ‘performance casualties’ in their firms.  The 
focus on the bottom line means that a lot of the resources associated with professional 
socialization have been cut; large law firms are no longer a venue to learn how to become a 
leader, a client developer, or even a good case manager.  Faced with diminishing work, the lucky 
associates have . . . retooled by . . . changing substantive areas of practice, or mov[ing] to smaller 
firms where work is easier to obtain.”); Van Zandt, supra note 8, at 1131 (indicating that the 
recession will further intesify the competitive trend among law firms). 
 13. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
24, 2007, at A1; see also Nathan Koppel, K&L Gates Gains as Rival Law Firms Suffer, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 25, 2009, at B8 (“The recession has cut demand for many corporate legal services, 
including work on mergers, real estate and corporate finance.  In turn, profits at firms across the 
country have plummeted, forcing many of them to fire attorneys, freeze salaries and shut 
offices.”); Patrick G. Lee, Law Schools Get Practical: With the Tight Job Market, Course 
Emphasis Shifts from Textbooks to Skill Sets, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2011, at B5 (noting the small 
percentages of law students hired by large firms); The Firm Report: Entry-Level Recruiting Slows 
with Economy, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2009, at 4 (observing that the recession prompted the 
downturn in legal employment in the fall of 2008); Karen Sloan, The Bloom Is Coming off the 
Rose for Prospective Law Students, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 26, 2011, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202520270239 (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) 
(reporting that 2010 law-school graduates “had the lowest employment rate since 1996,” with 
only sixty-eight percent of graduates employed in law jobs nine months after graduation). 
 14. See Lee, supra note 13, at B5 (noting that law schools are starting to teach more 
practical skills to better prepare students for legal careers). 
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profession.15  Over the past two decades, law firms’ chief demand has been for 
new associates to come in the door with sufficient legal knowledge and skills 
to handle basic commercial and litigation matters under minimal supervision.16  
However, as Robert Lloyd explains in his cogent review of contemporary legal 
education, those charged with training the next generation of lawyers are 
largely ignoring the competitive needs of American law firms.17  Thus, 
although firms have become more demanding, American law schools have 
become less so.18  New associates therefore often find themselves ill prepared 
for the rigorous expectations and demands of their new employers.19   
                                                            
 15. See ALAN WATSON, THE SHAME OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION, at ix (2006) (“We 
[law schools] proudly claim not to be trade schools, but that is what we are.  The denial makes it 
inevitable that we will fail to be efficient trade schools.”); see also Talbot D’Alemberte, On Legal 
Education, 76 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1990) (“Our insistence that we are part of the academy and our 
insistence that we are not a trade school has actually led us to cut ourselves off from the people 
who have things to say to our students, people from the profession . . . .”); John E. Dunsford, 
Nihilism and Legal Education—A Response to Sanford Levinson, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 27, 30 
(1986) (remarking that law schools exist “halfway between Plato’s Academy and vocational 
training”); James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost 
Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83, 84 (1991) 
(noting the struggle that law schools encounter when transitioning students into the legal 
profession). 
 16. One law dean recently explained, “As we surveyed alumni and employers, we kept 
hearing that our graduates needed to be able [to] ‘hit the ground running’ in those initial  
jobs. . . .  Because we want to give our students an edge in a competitive job market, we focus on 
the skills most needed in those initial jobs.”  Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Educating Problem Solving 
Lawyers for Our Profession and Communities, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2009); see also 
Susan E. Provenzano & Lesley S. Kagan, Teaching in Reverse: A Positive Approach to Analytical 
Errors in 1L Writing, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 125 (2007) (underscoring the fact that “legal 
audiences expect upper-division students and law graduates to have achieved some level of 
analytical proficiency”); Anthony J. Sestric, In Defense of Law Schools, 53 J. MO. BAR  232, 233 
(1997) (stating that “it is only in recent years that law schools have been expected to prepare the 
student more completely for the full practice [of law],” largely because “the profession became 
unable to assimilate the new lawyers [through in-house training and mentoring] in the same 
manner and degree that it had historically and traditionally done”); Timothy P. Terrell, A Tour of 
the Whine Country: The Challenge of Extending the Tenets of Lawyer Professionalism to Law 
Professors and Law Students, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (1994) (stressing that law firms expect 
“new associates [to] work on very complex matters from their first moments in the office”); Van 
Zandt, supra note 8, at 1130 (noting that firms expect new associates to interact with clients as 
soon as they begin working and that consequently, mentorship is often dispensed with in favor of 
productivity).  But see Jeff Jeffrey, For Some Firms, An Extra Step for the Newest Recruits, 
NAT’L L.J., June 29, 2009, at 7 (pointing out that some firms continue their mentorship programs, 
but only by cutting annual salaries up to $80,000 for the mentored new associates during their 
first two years of employment). 
 17. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 677. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; see also Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: The First 
Images, 1 LEGAL WRITING 123, 127 (1991) (advocating for increased training for law students in 
light of current law-school graduates’ “ill-prepar[ation] for immediate practice” and that “law 
firms . . . should not have to ‘pick up the difference’”). 
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One obvious sign of this education-to-profession disjunction20 is that judges 
and attorneys have been complaining insistently for some thirty years that law 
graduates are unable to communicate effectively through both oral and written 
means.21  This inability translates into subpar analytical skills, because 
language is the only medium of analysis.22  The dependence of good writing on 
good thinking cannot be overemphasized.23  When judges and firms’ hiring 
partners criticize the lamentable writing of modern law students and when 
those same students exclaim defensively in reviewing their examination 
answers that they knew the right answer, but failed to articulate it adequately, 
both the professionals and the students betray a shared misconception that 
                                                            
 20. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (suggesting that law schools are moving 
toward a theory-based teaching model, instead of practice-based, whereas firms are moving 
toward a profit-driven model). 
 21. DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0—LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 59 
(2009); see also, e.g., Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Writing—A Lawyer’s Professional 
Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 493–94 (1999) (noting the long-standing complaints about 
the quality of legal writing and the critical need for improvement); Stewart Macaulay & Henry G. 
Manne, A Low-Cost Legal Writing Program—The Wisconsin Experience, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
387, 389 (1959) (“[T]oo often . . . legal writing has become the stepchild of the curriculum, 
unwanted, starved, and neglected.”); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A 
Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 37 n.3, 38 (1994) (noting that in recent decades, writing has 
become even more important in legal practice but that the quality of legal writing is insufficient); 
Steven Stark, Comment, Why Lawyers Can’t Write, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (1984) 
(“‘[L]egal writing’ has become synonymous with poor writing . . . .”).  Furthermore, if the 2008 
Law School Survey of Student Engagement is reflective of a broad student consensus, law 
students are aware of their deficient writing skills, as almost half of the nearly 30,000 responding 
law students from eighty-five schools reported that they did not have enough practice and training 
in law school to develop their legal-writing skills.  LAW SCH. SURVEY OF STUDENT 
ENGAGEMENT, 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS: STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOL: 
PREPARING 21ST CENTURY LAWYERS 7, 10 (2009), available at http://lssse.iub.edu/2008 
_Annual_Report/pdf/lssse_Annual_Report_2008.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., Peter W. Gross, On Law School Training in Analytic Skill, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
261, 266 (1973) (noting the interrelated nature of legal writing and analysis); Joseph M. Williams, 
On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 1, 1 (1991) (“[L]aw firms regularly complain that the law schools aren’t teaching 
their graduates how to write or think critically.” (emphasis added)).  Indeed, the analytical 
complexity of contemporary law and its concomitant pressures and demands on contemporary 
lawyers help explain the widely acknowledged view that good writing has, in recent decades, 
become even more important in legal practice.  See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 21, at 37. 
 23. See Gross, supra note 22, at 266 (emphasizing the negative correlation between poor 
legal writing skills and legal analysis); Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s 
“Wicked Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 907–13 (2009) (discussing the necessity and 
importance of developing legal literacy in the first year of law school).  A veteran professor, who 
has taught legal writing and analysis as a part of first-year doctrinal courses for over twenty-five 
years, similarly noted that law students are unable to write effectively because they do not fully 
understand the subject matter.  Interview with Mark H. Grunewald, Interim Dean & James P. 
Morefield Professor, Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, in Lexington, Va. (Sept. 7, 2010) 
[hereinafter Grunewald Interview] (on file with author). 
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writing and thinking are discrete skills, such that poor prose might conceal 
good thinking.24  Nothing could be more untrue and harmful, for language 
itself provides the only dimension of human expression and explanation.25  
Thus, law school graduates’ poor writing skills do not distort some pristine 
essence of their otherwise straightforward thinking; rather, their confusing 
prose reflects their confused thinking.26 
III.  LAW SCHOOL EFFORT GOES DOWN: LOW FACULTY EXPECTATIONS MEET 
STUDENTS’ HIGH TIME PREFERENCES—THE MAKING OF A PERFECT 
EDUCATIONAL STORM  
It has been argued that the recent “softening” of American law schools 
resulted, in part, from the change in law-school curricula that commenced in 
the late 1960s and 1970s.27  This new model decreased the number of required 
courses and created numerous electives resulting in a buffet of curricular 
options.28 This model allows contemporary law students to “get a degree with 
                                                            
 24. See Gross, supra note 22, at 266 (contending that legal writing is not “a separable and 
peripheral subject”).  There are signs, however, that the common misconception is abating.  In a 
2001 survey of judges and practicing attorneys, almost sixty percent of the respondents stated that 
recent law-school graduates write poorly, with “poorly” encompassing deficiencies in both style 
and substance.  See Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, How Judges, Practitioners, 
and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A Comparative 
Study, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80, 85–87 (2003) (reporting that stylistic deficiencies included 
“wordiness,” “sloppy language,” and the “overuse of quotations,” whereas substantive problems 
included the failure to identify and understand issues, “lack of focus,” and poor appreciation of 
facts and law); see also Reed Dickerson, Teaching Legal Writing in Law Schools (with a Special 
Nod to Legal Drafting), 16 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1979) (noting that focusing on legal 
writing only in terms of language overlooks writing’s important role in the enhancement of 
substantive ideas); Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students How to “Think 
Like Lawyers”: Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 885, 
885 (1991) (“Good writing results from good thinking.”). 
 25. See Gross, supra note 22, at 266; see also Michael Jordan, Law Teachers and the 
Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 62 (1996) (“We literally think through and 
experience the world through language.”). 
 26. With thirty years of experience teaching legal reasoning and writing, Professor James E. 
Moliterno similarly phrases this point: “I have usually found that the student who writes unclearly 
thinks unclearly.”  E-mail from James E. Moliterno, Vincent Bradford Professor of Law, 
Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (July 7, 2010, 12:03:38 CDT) (on file with 
author); see also infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 27. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 667, 677; see also Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School 
Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 276 (1986) (noting that “student  
activists . . . questioned the legitimacy of . . . law school methods”); Robert M. Lloyd, 
Consumerism in Legal Education, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 555 (1995) (criticizing the lack of the 
Socratic method in modern legal education). 
 28. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
143–44 (1978) (observing the lack of required courses for second- and third-year students at 
Harvard Law School and noting that “[i]n 1976-1977, students could choose from over 150 
elective courses”); Richard Linquanti, Factors in Students’ Selection of Courses, in GOING TO 
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the highest possible grades while doing the least possible work.”29  Such 
behavior is demonstrative of a “high time preference,” a desire to do little work 
in exchange for the quick gratification of a high reward.30  The growing trend 
toward a course selection “high time preference” is reciprocally connected  
to—and perhaps a driving factor in—the tendency of law faculties to make 
courses less challenging.31  These reciprocal forces from both sides of the 
podium combine to produce a nearly perfect storm—a dynamic of mutually 
reinforcing trends of less challenging courses and more student forum 
shopping for the courses that offer the highest grades for the least amount of 
study.32  
A.  Changes in Curricula Make Things Worse: Easy Courses and Teacher 
Evaluations Turn Students into Customers 
Legal classes that require students to develop and sharpen their  
legal-analysis and critical-reading skills, or hard courses, are being 
overshadowed by softer, easier courses that tend to focus on glossy topics, 
such as sports and entertainment law, or on modish political and cultural 
issues.33  These “law and” courses, such as “Law and Wildlife,”34 often offer 
more “and” than “law.”35  Students are enticed to enroll in such courses partly 
because the course grade often is based on less stressful grading techniques, 
such as term papers or “take home” final examinations, and because the grades 
in these courses are typically higher than those in the difficult courses.36  Not 
only do these easier courses fail to prepare law students for the current 
requirements and demands of law practice, but the proliferation of such 
courses encourages professors to soften the required core-curriculum courses 
                                                                                                                                         
LAW SCHOOL? READINGS ON A LEGAL CAREER 138, 138 ed. n. (Thomas Ehrlich & Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr. eds., 1975) (“The curricula at most law schools are elective after the first year.”). 
 29. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 684. 
 30. See Ron Paul, The Banks Versus the Constitution, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 471 
(2010) (explaining that, in economic terms, individuals with a high time preference desire 
immediate satisfaction, whereas those with a low time preference are more patient with regard to 
obtaining gratification); see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 684–85. 
 31. See infra Part III.A; see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 679. 
 32. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 685. 
 33. See id. at 677–78, 681–83. 
 34. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE E. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER, at xi (2009) 
(asserting the book’s usefulness for law students). 
 35. Johnson, supra note 8, at 1232; see also Anthony D’Amato, Rethinking Legal 
Education, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (stating that the “proliferation [of ‘law and’ courses] 
is a sign that collectively we are groping for a cure for educational malaise and aimlessness”). 
 36. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 678. 
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as well.37  Such tactics become necessary to guarantee course enrollments that 
are substantial enough to impress the dean when faculty raises are at stake.38 
Another change in the 1970s was the student “course evaluation,”39 which 
should not, if employed modestly, present a problem.40  Properly framed and 
administered, course evaluations could potentially provide teachers with  
first-hand information and observations about the effective and ineffective 
aspects of their teaching methods.41  Unfortunately, the actual practice of 
student evaluations presents three major problems.  First, there is pronounced 
and widespread over-reliance on student evaluations in hiring, compensating, 
and tenuring faculty.42  Second, the methods of composing and collecting 
student evaluations are “often haphazard and unscientific.”43  Third, these 
evaluations place an unrealistic demand on students’ limited capacity for 
dispassionate evaluation of the class and its instructors.44  That modern 
                                                            
 37. Id. at 680. 
 38. See infra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 679 (noting 
that if student enrollment in a particular course is low, the administration will cancel the class, 
thus incentivizing professors to offer easy classes). 
 39. Kissam, supra note 27, at 273. 
 40. See JOHN A. CENTRA, DETERMINING FACULTY EFFECTIVENESS: ASSESSING TEACHING, 
RESEARCH, AND SERVICE FOR PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND IMPROVEMENT 1–4 (1979) 
(describing the benefits of using student evaluations, but noting university administrators’ 
reliance on evaluations to justify decisions about tenure, and outlining the imperfections in the 
evaluation process as a whole). 
 41. See Arthur Best, Student Evaluations of Law Teaching Work Well: Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, 38 SW. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2008).  But see Dennis R. 
Honabach, Responding to “Educating Lawyers”: An Heretical Essay in Support of Abolishing 
Teaching Evaluations, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2008). 
 42. See John M. Conley, Can You Talk Like a Lawyer and Still Think Like a Human Being? 
Mertz’s The Language of Law School, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 991 (2009) (reviewing 
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 
(2007)) (noting that one reason for the softening of law-school curricula is the widespread 
professorial “pander[ing] to the student-customers whose evaluations and upper-class patronage 
can influence tenure and salary decisions”); see also Jordan, supra note 25, at 42 (describing the 
evaluation process as a “popularity contest” with regard to tenure decisions); Lloyd, supra note 8, 
at 683–84. 
 43. Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 
40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 407, 407 (1990) (suggesting that certain procedures for evaluating teaching 
“invite error”); see also Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 
82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 235, 235–37 (2008) (observing that despite strong indicators of racial and 
gender bias in student evaluations, administrations heavily rely upon them for employment 
decisions). 
 44. See Abel, supra note 43, at 424–26 (noting that personal student preferences and 
hostilities play a role in evaluations).  Unfortunately, many contemporary law deans are years 
removed from the classroom and have been on the administrative career track aimed at 
maintaining a healthy revenue stream.  See Gary J. Simson, To Teach or Not to Teach, 39 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 375, 378–80 (2008) (recommending that although law deans have multiple roles as 
administrators, they should continue to teach to keep “from falling into a thoroughly 
administrative mindset”).  This necessarily means, as Professor Stanley Fish recently observed, 
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students live in a “credentials society” and focus on the concomitant need for 
high marks exacerbates this limitation.45  In practice, the current system of 
student evaluation provides a strong incentive for law professors to please, 
rather than challenge, their students.46 
For the reasons detailed above, law students have decreased competition 
among themselves for high grades and simultaneously increased competition 
among law professors to garner sufficient course enrollment.47  Misplaced 
reliance on student evaluations, combined with easy course offerings, allow 
students to control the educational quality of their law-school experience, 
which leaves them at a level far below that expected of novice associates.48  In 
                                                                                                                                         
that whether or not they would consciously so phrase it, these educational leaders “actively want 
their colleges and universities to be like car dealerships, with an emphasis on the bottom  
line . . . and consumer choice.”  Stanley Fish, Deep in the Heart of Texas, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR (June 21, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/deep-
in-the-heart-of 
-texas/.  Given their years spent in this sort of administrative environment, too many modern law 
deans characterize law students as clients or customers, a terminology that naturally leads to the 
rhetorical question I once heard a dean pose in regard to student desires, “They’re our 
customers—how can they be wrong?” 
  Administrators and deans have thus improperly transferred the market principle of 
consumer sovereignty to the field of education, in which learning and knowledge have a 
perdurable, more objective content.  See STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 
158–59 (2008) (“[P]arents, students, and taxpayers are consumers of higher education only in the 
sense that they pay for it if they want it; they are not consumers in the sense that the operations of 
higher education should reflect either their desires or their judgments.”). 
 45. See JACQUES BARZUN, TEACHER IN AMERICA, at xiii–xiv (1981) (noting that the  
mid-1960s ushered in the idea that desired careers required advanced education).  A historian of 
American higher education has identified an economic component reinforcing the “credential” 
insistence of modern students by linking the cost, and corresponding debt, associated with higher 
education and the need to obtain high grades to signify success as “the direct purchase of 
degrees.”  John Zeugner, Five Stealth Transformations of American Higher Education, ORG. AM. 
HISTORIANS NEWSL. (Org. of Am. Historians, Bloomington, Ind.), May 2009, at 17. 
 46. See Kissam, supra note 27, at 273–74 (arguing that students tend to evaluate professors 
who lecture and spoon feed favorably, thereby discouraging teaching methods that focus on 
developing analytical skills); see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 684. 
 47. See supra notes 33–46 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra text accompanying notes 17–21.  In regard to educational goods and services, 
law-student insouciance, if not indifference, toward learning law can be explained by predictable 
psychological effects produced by the financing mechanisms of both public and private law 
schools.  See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & NICOS E. DEVLETOGLOU, ACADEMIA IN ANARCHY: AN 
ECONOMIC DIAGNOSIS 8–9 (1970).  For the former, taxpayers pay the great bulk of legal 
education’s costs, whereas some mix of taxpayers, private donors, and lenders finance the 
educational product for private schools.  See id. at 9.  In short, law students do not purchase their 
education.  Id. at 8.  Therefore, James Buchanan and Nicos Devletoglou conclude that under  
low-tuition and subsidized-tuition schemes, college students are offered a service that is free, in 
an economic sense.  Id. at 29.  This, in turn, leads to inefficient use.  Id.  It should be no surprise, 
then, that many students will treat learning with insouciance and indifference or, worse, “with 
disrespect and contempt.”  Id. 
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short, law faculties and deans’ expectations commensurately fall to 
accommodate their students’ high time preferences.49  
B.  Learning Legal Analysis Becomes Optional and the Socratic Method Fades 
Away 
As part of this reciprocal dynamic of “softening” in American legal 
education, lecturing and memorization of legal rules and other techniques of 
“information delivery” have replaced the development and strengthening of 
                                                                                                                                         
  My own informal discussions with Loyola’s highly leveraged students confirm the basic 
soundness of Buchanan and Devletoglou’s explanation, while also disclosing a phenomenon that 
makes their general university-education diagnosis accurate even for the professional colleges 
they largely exempted from their strictures.  See id. at 10–11.  Although the typical Loyola law 
student will secure some mix of government and government-subsidized “private” loans before 
each school year, most of these students have never paid back any loan, much less a $120,000 
loan.  Therefore, they regard their private-school education as essentially free because they give 
no thought to paying back their loans.  Because loan repayment hardly ever enters the typical law 
student’s thoughts, much less his or her study plans and curricular calculations, the student “has 
no conception, individually, that costs are involved at all.”  Id. at 27. 
  Akin to Buchanan’s public-college students, then, “a sizable proportion” of law 
students—under any “low tuition scheme” subsidized by taxpayers either directly, through state 
law schools, or indirectly through government loans—will “place a value on . . . education lower 
than the cost of providing this education.”  Id. at 29. 
 49. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.  Several commentators maintain that the 
only countervailing force keeping law schools and their students from relaxing even more is the 
necessity that students pass their state’s bar exams.  See, e.g., Christian C. Day, Law Schools Can 
Solve the “Bar Pass Problem”—“Do the Work!,” 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 324 (2004) (“[B]ar 
examiners do effective and critical jobs of protecting the public from graduates who have not 
mastered the basics necessary to practice law.”); Lloyd, supra note 8, at 685 (citing the bar exam 
as the key check on law students’ high time preference). 
  Professor Christian Day faults law professors for failing to hold students to rigorous 
academic standards and notes that many feel that it is the responsibility of the bar examiners, not 
faculty members, to prepare students for legal practice.  Day, supra, at 332.  Day is accurate in his 
description of professorial indifference toward their public trust.  In my current institution, for 
example, our fifteen-year average on the Louisiana bar examination is a failure rate of roughly 
thirty-three percent (with a comparable failure rate on most out-of-state bars).  Yet, to qualify to 
sit for any bar exam, a student must graduate with a cumulative average of at least a flat “C” (2.0 
on a 4-point scale).  Academic Regulations Overview, LOY. U. L. BULL. 2011–2012, 
http://2011bulletin.loyno.edu/law/academic-regulations-overview#graduation-requirements (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2012).  Thus, all Loyola graduates have passed the faculty’s tests, but tellingly, 
approximately one-third of the school’s “passing” students cannot pass the one test that the 
Loyola faculty does not grade—the state bar examination.  The Soviet-era Russian workers’ joke, 
“we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us,” can be adapted to reflect current law students’ 
experience of diminished efforts on both sides of the classroom lectern: “we pretend to learn and 
they pretend to teach.”  See Murray Sperber, How Undergraduate Education Became College 
Lite—And a Personal Apology, in DECLINING BY DEGREES: HIGHER EDUCATION AT RISK 131, 
138 (Richard H. Hersh & John Merrow eds., 2005) (finding Soviet history illuminating in the 
context of undergraduate education and describing the relationship between professors and 
students as one of “mutual nonaggression”). 
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legal analysis skills,50 which law firms still consider a sine qua non skill.51  
Instead of being forced to learn and apply a body of law to typical legal 
problems, students are afforded the opportunity to attend class unprepared, 
with no incentive to engage in class discussion or dialectical analysis.52  
Students often attend class simply to meet the eligibility requirements set by 
the American Bar Association.53  As a result, “few law students actually 
experience the active in-class engagement that . . . law school demands.”54 
Relatedly, the Socratic case method55—traditionally heralded as one of the 
best means for developing analytical skills56—has largely been  
                                                            
 50. See Lloyd, supra note 8, at 680. 
 51. See Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 245 (1992) (“Problem-solving is the single intellectual skill on which all 
law practice is based.”).  This much, at least, has not changed since the days of Deans Christopher 
Langdell and James Ames of the early Harvard Law School.  See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 
20, 37; see also  Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 597, 610–11 (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 35, at 11 (describing students’ lack of preparedness for 
class); Lloyd, supra note 8, at 682 (noting that the classroom is no longer a rigorous learning 
environment, but rather a place where students can “slide by”); Richard S. Markovits, The 
Professional Assessment of Legal Academics: On the Shift from Evaluator Judgment to Market 
Evaluations, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417, 421 (1998) (observing law students’ preference for legal 
conclusions over legal analysis and arguments). 
 53. See D’Amato, supra note 35, at 11 (noting that contemporary law students “are 
increasingly cutting classes when they can get away with it”); see also STANDARDS AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 304(d) (2011) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N 
STANDARDS FOR LAW SCHOOLS], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2012_standards_chapter_3.authcheckdam.pdf (“A 
law school shall require regular and punctual class attendance.”). 
 54. Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Question: What Is the Purpose of Law School?, 
53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48, 64 (2003). 
 55. See Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 
114 n.3 (1999) (“[T]he ‘traditional’ Socratic method [is] a teaching style in which the professor 
selects a single student without warning and questions the student about a particular judicial 
opinion that has been assigned for class.  Often the professor begins by asking the student to state 
the facts of the case and then asks the student to explain how the court reasoned to an answer.  
The professor might then test the student’s understanding of the case by posing a series of 
hypotheticals and asking the student to apply the reasoning of the case to the new fact patterns.  
The purpose of this questioning is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of various legal 
arguments that might be marshaled to support or attack a given . . . decision.  To that end, the 
professor’s inquiries are often designed to expose the weaknesses in the student’s responses.”). 
See generally Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90), 
109 HARV. L. REV. 911 (1996); Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379 
(1952); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 725 (1989) (describing the Socratic case method). 
 56. See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 29 (1914) (noting “the great value of th[e] Socratic method of 
instruction”); see also WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
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abandoned57 for being “intimidating,” “adversarial,” and  
 
                                                                                                                                         
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 198–200 (2007) (extolling the virtues of the case method); THOMSON, 
supra note 21, at 65 (commenting on the conclusion that the Socratic case method is successful at 
teaching students to “think[] like a lawyer”); Richard B. Parker, A Review of Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance with Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318, 
326–27 (1976) (noting that although sometimes risky, structured questioning of students is 
actually designed to enhance their confidence). 
  The conclusion of these general studies is confirmed by the personal testimony of 
students who were educated by masters of the Socratic classroom dialogue.  Professor Anthony 
D’Amato described how in law school, he was, for the first time in his life, “shocked into an 
experience of actual learning” by professors such as Lon Fuller and “Warren Seavey, the 
grandmaster of ping-pong classroom technique.”  Anthony D’Amato, The Decline and Fall of 
Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 465 (1987).  Also, 
according to his students’ accounts, the techniques of legal reasoning and the Socratic dialogue 
provided the basis for Professor H.L.A. Hart’s confident and effective teaching.  See NICOLA 
LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 130–31 (2004). 
 57. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, A NATION OF LAWS: AMERICA’S IMPERFECT PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE 192 n.43 (2010) (concluding, in what might be the historical understatement of our 
young century, that the sort of high-impact Socratic exercise portrayed in “Paper Chase  
and . . .  One L . . . may not be entirely representative of legal education today.”).  For the 
voluminous evidence of the near total disappearance of the Socratic case method overlooked by 
Professor Peter Hoffer, see PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING 
OF MODERN LAWYERS 37 n.75 (2003) (noting the widespread perception among law professors 
that the Socratic “method has been in decline since the 1950s and 60s”); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & 
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 164–66 (1977) (reporting that 
the conclusion of an empirical study of classes at the University of Indiana at Indianapolis, Notre 
Dame, and Valparaiso Law Schools indicated that lecture constituted the primary method of 
teaching and that the Socratic case method “has almost disappeared,” even in first-year courses); 
Conley, supra note 42, at 991 (“Pure Socratic teaching is now exceedingly rare in my 
observation, and largely devoid of the sarcasm.”); Kerr, supra note 55, at 114 (describing the 
Socratic method as being “more myth than reality”); Lloyd, supra note 8, at 681 (observing that 
the Socratic case method “has vanished from American law schools”). 
  Even an esteemed, dedicated law teacher who encouraged me as a novice law professor 
constantly to question and challenge students’ presentations and interpretations of cases now 
employs what I call the Alphabetic Socratic method—resulting in no more cold calls.  See 
Telephone Interview with Thomas E. Baker, Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ. Coll. of Law (July 
2010) [hereinafter Baker Interview] (on file with author).  Instead, students know in advance 
when their assigned participation day will arrive and therefore prepare deeply and thoroughly for 
this class only.  E-mail from Thomas E. Baker, Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ. Coll. of Law, to 
author (July 19, 2010, 9:46:49 CDT) [hereinafter Baker E-mail].  Dealing with unprepared 
students, my former colleague tells me, wastes valuable class time.  Baker Interview, supra.  
Professor Lloyd reports that this method of conducting class has become widespread.  Lloyd, 
supra note 8, at 683. 
  Even students recognize and admit the central shortcoming of this pseudo-Socratic 
method: it lacks an incentive to read and prepare every assigned case for every class and to attend 
the flow of the classroom dialogue closely.  See, e.g., ERIC OWENS ET AL., THE BEST 172 LAW 
SCHOOLS 338 (2011 ed. 2010) (reporting that a University of Richmond 1L stated that the 
Socratic method “‘can be a bit intimidating,’” but quickly admitted that “‘[i]t makes class 
entertaining and ensures that you are prepared’”); Christianna R. Dougherty, Student Perspective 
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“demeaning.”58  As a result, law professors have replaced the traditional 
“case dialectic” method with approaches more solicitous of the law student’s 
daily contentedness.59  Not surprisingly, after leaving the “contented 
classroom,” new associates find law practice to be everything that law school 
is not—intimidating, adversarial, and sometimes even demeaning.60    
C.  The Result: Poorly Schooled Law-School Graduates 
Whether or not students complain about the Socratic method’s brutality, 
most believe that the current, softened teaching style provides a better mode of 
professional training.61  As novice associates, new graduates soon suffer for the 
style’s deficiencies when they are faced with the task of meeting the demands 
of highly competitive law firms.62  Law schools that teach basic skills and 
instill a desire to study, learn, and outperform others are providing their 
                                                                                                                                         
After the First Year, in LEGAL EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 289, 293 (Donald B. King 
ed., 1999) (stating that for “a first-year student, the most comforting class is the one where the 
professor lets you know the day ‘you are up,’” because then “you have time to get your act 
together . . . by studying every aspect of your case,” despite the fact that the traditional Socratic 
method “makes you read every case”). 
 58. See Lloyd, supra note 8, at 681 (surveying a representative sample of law review 
articles critiquing the Socratic method and selecting the quoted adjectives as typifying and 
essentially summarizing the modern academic critique).  Professors Phillip Areeda and Richard 
Parker each highlighted the inherently strenuous nature of effective Socratic teaching.  See 
Areeda, supra note 55, at 916–17 (discussing the redeeming aspects of the Socratic method, 
despite students’ criticisms); Parker, supra note 56, at 326–27 (“A student can be put through a 
skillfully structured ordeal which, though unpleasant at the time, will drive him to greater efforts 
and thereby increase his confidence and his capacity for continued self-training.”). 
 59. See Kerr, supra note 55, at 123–25 (describing the group-learning and role-playing 
exercises that have replaced traditional Socratic instruction at Harvard Law School).  Professor 
John Conley offers three main reasons for the displacement of “[p]ure Socratic teaching” by 
“modified” Socratic methods: (1) “compressed first-year courses that require a good deal of 
lecturing to achieve reasonable coverage”; (2) a “gentler attitude toward students”; and (3) “a 
desire to pander to the student-customers whose evaluations and upper-class patronage can 
influence tenure and salary decisions.”  Conley, supra note 42, at 991. 
 60. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 681. 
 61. It is telling that most critical reference to the legendarily brutal Socratic method does not 
adduce real professors, but a fictional Hollywood character—Professor Kingsfield.  See THE 
PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1973); see also THOMSON, supra note 21, at 
139 (suggesting that the “Kingsfield model” of teaching may harm students); Conley, supra note 
42, at 991 (“The classic Socratic purist . . . is epitomized by Kingsfield of Paper Chase . . . 
infamy.”).  But see Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in 
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 960 (2005) (arguing that Kingsfield’s portrayal of the 
Socratic method “teaches highly relevant and practical skills”). 
 62. See Kissam, supra note 9, at 1981 (noting that upon graduation, law students are 
expected to have exemplary communication and problem-solving skills); see also Lloyd, supra 
note 8, at 677, 690 (discussing the need for law schools to adopt a more rigorous teaching method 
to reflect the realities of law practice). 
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students with the ability to exercise more control over their careers by helping 
them develop a reputation for producing first-rate legal work.63   
New associates who are capable of taking responsibility and producing 
quality work will earn the repute and trust that leads to rewarding careers.64  In 
contrast, new associates who take a passive approach to their workplace 
performance tend to be classified as irrelevant to the firm’s success.65  If an 
associate is not considered indispensable, then he or she is at risk.66  As a 
result, first-year associates are encouraged to “spare no effort” or time in the 
quest to become an invaluable resource.67  Law firms assume that this sort of 
effort comes from a solid foundation of analytical ability developed in law 
school.68 
Contemporary law firms provide new associates opportunities to embrace 
assignments with such fervor and tenacity that each can become the firm’s 
resident expert on some topic—often a topic never encountered, much less 
studied, during law school.69  New associates are expected to be capable of 
learning, exploring, and analyzing the law, and firms thus routinely assume 
that associates will independently take responsibility for figuring out the 
answers.70  In contrast to the approach of many law students, the best junior 
associates are always looking for more to do.71  Gaining an understanding of 
the law, the cases, and the clients is necessary to successful legal practice, and 
doing so better than anyone else will make a new associate an indispensable 
resource.72   
Unfortunately, when graduates of today’s law schools are required to 
demonstrate the legal analysis skills presumed to have been developed during 
law school, firms are often surprised by their inability to perform at the level 
expected.73  The next step in this surprising process might be a highly 
uncomfortable meeting with supervising partners, which consists of the 
                                                            
 63. MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW 26–27 (2006) 
(recommending that new associates take a proactive approach to assignments when working at 
law firms because once they prove that they can contribute intelligently, they will be given 
greater opportunities). 
 64. See id.; see also Van Zandt, supra note 8, at 1130 (stating that immediate productivity is 
an essential characteristic of new lawyers who hope to advance). 
 65. See HERRMANN, supra note 63, at 27. 
 66. Id. at 24. 
 67. Id. at 23. 
 68. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1246 (“[F]irms depend on law schools to teach students to 
think analytically during the first year.”). 
 69. See HERRMANN, supra note 63, at 23. 
 70. Id. at 12. 
 71. See id. at 26; see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 684–85. 
 72. HERRMANN, supra note 63, at 27. 
 73. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1245 (noting that even top graduates from elite law 
schools may prove to be disappointing). 
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partners’ queries about their inept attempts to practice law. Understandably, 
the disappointment, frustration, depression, and regret that undoubtedly follow 
such meetings take their toll on new associates.  For the more self-reflective 
associates, the frustration might well be accompanied by the nagging question, 
“why didn’t law school prepare me for this?”  However, until modern law 
professors assist students in achieving the analysis and writing that modern law 
firms expect,74 law schools will continue to produce a significant number of 
unprepared and therefore unmarketable graduates during a time when the legal 
job market is as competitive as ever.75 
IV.  DIAGNOSIS: MODERN LAW STUDENTS NEED A DIFFERENT  
EDUCATION—BUT WHY?  
Like most simple questions, a solution to the legal education dilemma 
produces multiple, complex answers.  Professor Anthony D’Amato provided 
one answer some twenty years ago in his well-known article The Decline and 
Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism.76  Professor 
D’Amato argues that law faculties and deans have encouraged the 
transformation of the law student’s status from pupil to customer.77  Because 
the customer is always right, law professors must pander to students by 
simplifying their courses and relaxing their standards to receive the positive 
student evaluations that deans and faculties rely on so heavily.78 
Additionally, current law students exhibit a high time preference,79 in part 
because modern law schools are increasingly finding their classrooms 
populated by students who lack the basic analytical and communication skills 
necessary for doing well in law school and modern law firms.80  When these 
                                                            
 74. Because the modern university’s research and service priority has captured the 
allegiance of many law professors and deans, it is unlikely that law faculties will proactively 
devote greater attention to teaching essential skills.  See Patrick Allitt, Faculty Norms Inhibit 
Excellence, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3, 2010, at A10 (“[T]he widespread awareness that the 
rewards of academic life most often go to the scholars, not the teachers, makes teaching very 
much the poor relation.  Students suffer accordingly.”). 
 75. See supra Parts I–II; see also supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 76. See generally D’Amato, supra note 56. 
 77. Id. at 494. 
 78. See id. at 461–62; see also supra Part III.A. 
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 28–32. 
 80. See Aïda M. Alaka, Phenomenology of Error in Legal Writing, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
1, 4 (2009) (noting that many contemporary law students have received little instruction on the 
technical aspects of writing); Cohen, supra note 21, at 515 (stating that many law students did not 
acquire the basic writing skills taught in high school and college); Emily Grant, Toward a Deeper 
Understanding of Legal Research and Writing as a Developing Profession, 27 VT. L. REV. 371, 
387 (2003) (acknowledging that many law students fail to acquire basic writing skills as 
undergraduates); Joseph Kimble, Plain English: A Charter for Clear Writing, 9 COOLEY L. REV. 
1, 4 (1992) (arguing that the writing skills of college-bound students are in decline and noting that  
SAT verbal scores are lower than ever). 
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ill-prepared undergraduates become 1Ls and hit the analytical wall, they 
naturally do not blame themselves—they blame the wall.81  The origin of this 
unhappy collision with reality can be remotely traced to the softening of 
modern undergraduate programs.82  Therefore, the contemporary law-school 
admission pool is filled with students who have been programmed to expect 
maximum results with little effort.83  Modern law schools have thus become 
populated with undergraduate students who have not been educated, trained, or 
equipped with the desired analytical skills.84   
                                                            
 81. See, e.g., Nancy Millich, Building Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street 
Skills” and Sophisticated Educational Learning Theories in Teaching a Seminar in Legal 
Analysis and Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1143 (1994) (observing that second-year 
law students often have diminished self-confidence due to poor grades in their 1L year and that 
such students sometimes “will manifest their insecurities by blaming the law school or a 
particular professor for their academic difficulties”); Terrell, supra note 16, at 12 (noting that the 
receipt of grades to which most law students are unaccustomed “provokes defense mechanisms 
aimed at the common villain of excessive [faculty] emphasis on the difficult idea of analytic 
thinking”).  Professor Francis A. Allen discerned and diagnosed this “blame the wall” syndrome 
over thirty years ago.  See Francis A. Allen, The New Anti-intellectualism in American Legal 
Education, 28 MERCER L. REV. 447, 460 (1977) (noting that law students who experience the 
tension between the need to succeed and the pain that accompanies the academic rigors of law 
school often express “resentment against the institution and the education process that engender 
it”). 
 82. See Kissam, supra note 9, at 1972 (concluding that “increasing attention and resources 
have been devoted by the university to faculty research, scholarship, and training of graduate 
students, while undergraduate education has been left to survive as something of a poor cousin”); 
see also Lloyd, supra note 8, at 679–80 (contending that because the viability of many liberal-arts 
undergraduate departments is based on a significant percentage of students who intend to pursue 
law degrees, undergraduate faculties are also encouraged to dumb down courses to increase the 
grade point averages of potential future law students to increase the students’ chances of gaining 
admission to law school). 
 83. See RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING 
ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 70 (2011) (“[S]tudents often embrace[] a ‘credentialist-collegiate 
orientation’ that focuse[s] on earning a degree with as little effort as possible.”); see also supra 
text accompanying note 45. 
 84. As one college professor tersely described the problem, young Americans are not 
learning how to think.  Thomas Bertonneau, What, Me Read?, JOHN WILLIAM POPE CENTER FOR 
HIGHER EDUC. POLICY (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article. 
html?id=2120 (analyzing his students’ examinations in his world-literature class and concluding 
that “[t]he inability of many students to cognize even such basic elements as story—first ‘A’ 
happens, then ‘B’ happens, and so forth—is alarming”); see also Jordan, supra note 25, at 61 
(stating that students at all levels of education lack a strong foundation in communication and 
analytical skills); Francis J. Mootz III, Vico’s “Ingenious Method” and Legal Education, 83  
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1261, 1301 (2008) (“All too often, students arrive at law school lacking basic 
communication skills because they have not been provided a rigorous education in persuasive 
speaking and writing.”). 
  Popular journalistic accounts of the modern university confirm the accuracy of the 
foregoing scholarly diagnoses.  Craig Brandon, an education reporter and former writing 
instructor at Keene State College in New Hampshire, recently surveyed non-elite colleges and 
found that most have abandoned serious academic standards and performance accountability.  See 
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Predictably, 
[w]hen these students enroll in law school, the pressure builds for the 
curriculum to suit the kind of ‘thinking’ and ‘learning’ to which 
these students have become accustomed.  The curriculum and 
teaching will tend to shrink to fit the student rather than encouraging 
students to grow to meet the intellectual demands engendered by the 
curriculum.85 
One major reason for the modern law student’s lack of writing and verbal 
skills is that high school and college students no longer receive a classical 
liberal-arts education.86  From the late seventeenth century through the end of 
the nineteenth century, all levels of American schooling were dedicated to the 
study of classical literature and history.87  Assuming, perhaps, that this 
classical curriculum still reigns in American schools, law professors expect 
                                                                                                                                         
CRAIG BRANDON, THE FIVE-YEAR PARTY: HOW COLLEGES HAVE GIVEN UP ON EDUCATING 
YOUR CHILD AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT, at ix, 5–6 (2010).  An economic analysis of 
historical trends in college students’ use of time during the school year supports this bleak 
appraisal of contemporary collegiate education: 
Mindy S. Marks, an assistant professor of economics at the University of California at 
Riverside, performed a study that showed college students spend 10 fewer hours a week 
studying now than they did in 1961.  Meanwhile, college grades on average have gone 
up.  Unless one is to assume that current students learn much more, much faster than 
students did 50 years ago, a natural conclusion is that professors are demanding less 
while giving better grades. 
Robin Wilson, Why Teaching Is Not Priority No. 1, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 2010, at A1. 
 85. Jordan, supra note 25, at 68. 
 86. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 9, at 1972 (“Law students may begin their legal education 
with rather limited motivations, aptitudes, or experiences in several intellectual activities that are 
preconditions for successful learning in the case method/final examination system.  These 
activities include: the careful, critical, imaginative reading of complicated texts, the 
contemplation of ethical questions—as presented by literature, philosophy, or the social 
sciences—and the writing of coherent texts on complex subjects . . . .”); see also supra notes  
79–84 and accompanying text. 
  Ironically, the noted lack of undergraduate education in liberal arts and social sciences 
provides a strong reason to continue relying on the Socratic case method for the bulk of 1L 
teaching.  In his autobiography, Professor Samuel Williston offered a proleptic retort to those 
who maintain that Socratic rigors are inappropriate for modern law students.  SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 212 (1940) (“[A] lawyer who has not acquired 
when young the power to reason logically from legal principles rarely acquires it later, and few 
will care to deny that such power is an indispensable part of the equipment of a well trained 
lawyer.”). 
 87. See LEE T. PEARCY, THE GRAMMAR OF OUR CIVILITY: CLASSICAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA, at x, 45–74 (2005); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, 
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 20 (1994) (“Americans derived their curricula and 
pedagogical methods from the English educational system, which . . . had originated in the 
Middle Ages.  The medieval ‘trivium’ (rhetoric, logic, and grammar) and ‘quadrivium’ 
(arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) continued to dominate western curricula well into 
the nineteenth century.”); see also CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: 
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, 1780–1910, at 12 (2002). 
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entering law students to be equipped with the basic linguistic and analytical 
skills to rapidly grasp the techniques of case and statutory analysis.88   
However, this assumption is unjustified89 because today’s law students 
arrive from the modern “multiversity” of instrumental training.90  As a result, 
they “may be less capable or less interested in learning from the traditional 
case method or in writing competently about complex matters without 
extensive instruction or practice.”91  Moreover, because of increased 
competition among modern law firms,92 law students find that they must be 
prepared upon graduation to compete immediately for jobs that demand 
accomplished analytical abilities.93 
The true victims of this educational dereliction of duty are average law 
students from non-elite schools whose main desire is to finish the three-year 
sentence that the American Bar Association obliges them to serve94 and enter 
the legal job market.  Hence, this Article’s prescriptions are not at all a 
romantic plea for a return to some mythic Golden Age of legal education.  To 
the contrary, this Article’s argument proceeds from a stark acknowledgement 
of the current reality of poorly educated entering 1Ls who have studied all their 
undergraduate lives for machine-graded, information-retrieval tests.95  Thus, 
what may have been safely assumed during most of the twentieth  
century—namely, that students entered law school well grounded in critical 
                                                            
 88. See Jordan, supra note 25, at 59–60; see also Cathaleen A. Roach, Is the Sky Falling? 
Ruminations on Incoming Law Student Preparedness (and Implications for the Profession) in the 
Wake of Recent National and Other Reports, 11 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 295, 299 (2005) 
(detailing a law professor’s inquiries into the undergraduate writing experience and the varied 
responses). 
 89. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
 90. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE 
HUMANITIES 13–26 (2010) (critiquing the current educational emphasis on technology and the 
vocational skills suited to staying competitive in the global economy, with its concomitant loss of 
intellectual abilities crucial to the health of any democracy, especially the ability to think 
critically). 
 91. Kissam, supra note 9, at 1976; see also Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the 
Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561, 571 (1997) 
(“For many law students, law school represents the first intellectual challenge of their academic 
careers.”). 
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1246. 
 94. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 53, § 304(c) (noting 
that a J.D. degree cannot be obtained in less than twenty-four months). 
 95. See Dougherty, supra note 57, at 291 (stating that soon after law school begins, the  
first-year student learns that the happy “days of ‘multiple-guess’ and ‘scan-tron picture making’” 
are over); see also supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
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reading, writing, and reasoning skills—most decidedly does not occur today.96  
Therefore, we must teach, and our students must develop, those abilities.97   
                                                            
 96. See ARUM & ROKSA, supra note 83, at 35–37.  For example, Professors Richard Arum 
and Josipa Roska’s empirically and methodologically impeccable monograph focuses on what 
contemporary collegians actually learn, and their answer is, it turns out, not much.  Id.  The 
authors’ major data set comes from the performance of 2322 students on the Collegiate Learning 
Assessment (CLA), a standardized test administered to students in their first semester of college 
and again at the end of their second year.  Id. at 19–20.  The CLA deserves attention from  
law-school admissions committees because it is not a multiple-choice examination, but an  
open-ended writing assignment designed to test a student’s ability to think critically, solve 
problems analytically, and write cogently.  Id. at 21.  The CLA does this by posing a 
“performance task” that requires the test-takers to read a set of documents on a hypothetical 
problem in business or politics and write a memorandum advising a superior on how to respond 
by explaining the goal sought and a desirable course of action for achieving that outcome.  Id. at 
21–22. 
  The results are sobering.  The CLA data revealed that some forty-five percent of sample 
students made essentially no progress in critical reading, complex reasoning, and writing during 
their first two years of college.  Id. at 36.  Although factors such as educational background limit 
the students’ ability to improve their scores, Arum and Roksa conclude that two characteristics of 
the college experience are most important to improve performance on the CLA.  Id. at 93.  First, 
students must take rigorous courses with extensive reading and writing requirements.  Id.  
Second, students must study extensively out of class.  Id. at 97–98.  Undergirding these two 
characteristics of academic improvement is the fact that students learn more from the teachers 
who challenge them—a fact that does not need statistics to be recognized.  Id. at 93.  Another 
obvious fact is that students must do their own hard work to master the course material.  Id. at 
100.  Yet, the statistical demonstration is sadly necessary, given that one quarter of the students 
surveyed had not taken even one course that required twenty pages of writing or a course that 
required as much as forty pages of reading a week in the previous semester.  Id. at 93.  
Furthermore, the students reported spending, on average, only twelve hours a week studying, less 
than half of the twenty-five hours per week reported in 1961.  Id. at 69; see also Wilson, supra 
note 84, at A1. 
  In short, as one academic reviewer of the Arum and Roksa book concludes, universities 
and their students do not regard “classroom learning as a primary pursuit.”  Anthony Grafton, Our 
Universities: Why Are They Failing?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 24, 2011, at 38, 39. 
 97. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1252 (noting that contemporary law schools “fail to 
educate their students in legal doctrine and rigorous analytical thinking beyond the first year”).  
However, one must consider the possibility that current law students suffer under a disposition 
that is partly self-inflicted and partly rearing-imprinted.  The disposition is exhibited in 
individuals who have been brought up in a “quick technology fix” culture and thus have been 
conditioned to believe that there is always, or should always be, an easier way to achieve their 
goals.  See, e.g., Allen, supra note 81, at 459–60.  For example, parents may request that their 
children be removed from a teacher’s class simply because the teacher may have a reputation for 
being the hardest biology or algebra teacher for that grade level.  American children in the 1980s 
and 1990s were reared to expect that their goals can be achieved by minimizing any and all 
challenges that come along; and thus there is no shame or social stigma in looking for a way to 
avoid breaking a sweat to accomplish those goals.  Cf. Wilson, supra note 84, at A3 (noting that 
today’s college students find the coursework overwhelming despite receiving better grades than 
their age group did fifty years ago). 
  Thus, today’s over-protected students may not find themselves prepared for the 
demands of today’s law practice.  Francis Allen expressed the gravamen of the situation by 
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V.  THE REMEDY IS A RETURN TO CLASSICAL RHETORIC: A PRACTICAL 
PRESCRIPTION FOR TEACHING LEGAL REASONING AND WRITING  
The first step toward reform consists of the law-school faculty’s candid 
recognition of self-deception and failure.98  Having acknowledged its actual 
identity as a trade school, the law school can focus on training its 
apprentices—the students—for their vocation,99 a trade that depends on 
flawless writing, logical reasoning, and persuasive argumentation.100  Not 
coincidentally, these three skills make up the trivium—the classical and 
medieval curriculum of grammar, logic, and rhetoric,101 which formed the 
basis of legal education for centuries.102 
                                                                                                                                         
emphasizing that “the origins of the malaise now being experienced in the law schools are to be 
found not in legal education’s sins . . . but in events and cultural movements that typify our entire 
social life.”  Allen, supra note 81, at 451. 
 98. See supra Part III. 
 99. See Jim Chen, Truth and Beauty: A Legal Translation, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 261, 262 
(2010) (“Law schools have a single mission: we train people to become lawyers . . . .”); 
Henderson, supra note 54, at 56 (referring to law schools as the “primary gatekeepers for the 
legal profession”). 
 100. See Terrell, supra note 16, at 16 (stating that “the first tenet of lawyer  
professionalism . . . is excellence”); Stephanie A. Vaughan, Persuasion Is an Art . . . But It Is Also 
an Invaluable Tool in Advocacy, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 635, 638 (2009) (emphasizing the skills 
necessary to be effective at persuasion); see also supra notes 68, 74–75, 96–97 and accompanying 
text. 
 101. SISTER MIRIAM JOSEPH, THE TRIVIUM: THE LIBERAL ARTS OF LOGIC, GRAMMAR, AND 
RHETORIC: UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 3 (Marguerite 
McGlinn ed., 2002); RICHARD, supra note 87, at 20.  Trivium “is Latin for ‘three roads,’ or a 
place where three ways meet.”  LEIGH A. BORTINS, THE CORE: TEACHING YOUR CHILD THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF CLASSICAL EDUCATION 14 (2010).  As one modern advocate of teaching the 
trivium explains, grammar is the study of vocabulary and basic linguistic structures.  Id. at 48.  
Logic or dialectic constitutes the skill of abstracting from particulars and inferring from 
generalities.  Id. at 52–53.  Rhetoric provides the ability to “speak and write persuasively and 
eloquently about any topic while integrating allusions and examples from one field of study to 
explain a point in another.”  Id. at 54; see also EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 16 (4th ed. 1999) (noting that classical 
rhetoric emphasized “persuasive discourse”); GEORGE A. KENNEDY, A NEW HISTORY OF 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC, at xi (1994) (“[R]hetoric as that term was usually understood throughout 
classical antiquity [meant] the art of persuasion by words or the art of civic discourse . . . .”). 
Given rhetoric’s civic role and intellectual content, its importance in both ancient and modern law 
teaching is understandable and unsurprising because a law professor’s first task is to teach 
students how to use the same legal precedents and material facts available to the opposing party 
in delivering a persuasive interpretation to the court.  See Jason K. Cohen, Attorneys at the 
Podium: A Plain-Language Approach to Using the Rhetorical Situation in Public Speaking 
Outside the Courtroom, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 73, 75 n.4 (2011). 
 102. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS 248 (2008) (noting medieval universities’ emphasis on 
students’ development of persuasive arguments); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & 
BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 169, 175–76 (2009) (describing the focus on crafting arguments in the early 
2012] Law Students' Poor Writing and Legal Analysis Skills 757 
A.  The History of Legal Education and Rhetoric: A Common Heritage  
Renaissance and early modern Europe witnessed the growth of specialized 
education for lawyers, and although the curriculums varied from country to 
country, each centered on the study of rhetoric.103  Although the dominance of 
classical education during these eras meant that grammar and logic were a 
central part of even basic schooling, legal education’s emphasis on rhetoric 
mandated further development of students’ grammar and logic skills.104  
Moreover, the Renaissance’s rediscovery of the complete rhetorical treatises of 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian abetted and intensified legal education’s focus 
on rhetoric.105 
Thus, early modern-era English legal education merely continued a tradition 
that stretched back to Greco-Roman antiquity.106  Indeed, law and rhetoric 
were so intertwined in classical and medieval times that law did not become an 
independent university course, distinct from rhetoric, until the twelfth 
century.107  The study of rhetoric remained an integral component of English 
legal education, even when lawyers were trained in the London Inns of Court 
                                                                                                                                         
Inns of Court).  But see Lisa A. Perry, Legal Handbooks as Rhetoric Books for Common Lawyers 
in Early Modern England, in LEARNING THE LAW: TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF LAW 
IN ENGLAND 1150–1900, at 273, 275 (Jonathan A. Bush & Alain Wijffels eds., 1999) (finding the 
formal study of rhetoric lacking in English lawyers’ training in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries). 
  The Renaissance reconfigured the medieval trivium by adding the subjects of history, 
poetry, and moral philosophy, among others, to create the studia humanitatis.  Donald Phillip 
Verene, Vichian Moral Philosophy: Prudence as Jurisprudence, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1107, 
1108 (2008); see also SISTER JOAN MARIE LECHNER, RENAISSANCE CONCEPTS OF THE 
COMMONPLACES: AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL AND UNIVERSAL IDEAS 
USED IN ALL ARGUMENTATION AND PERSUASION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE 
EDUCATIONAL AND LITERARY TRADITION OF THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 
45–46 (1962) (noting the evolving nature of rhetoric during the medieval renaissance). 
 103. See MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST 
HERITAGE 9 (2005); CHAЇM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL 
AND LEGAL REASONING 121 (1980); Harold J. Berman, Introduction to PERELMAN, supra, at ix 
(“[I]t is no accident that law in the West was once studied as a branch of rhetoric.”); Marianne 
Constable, On the (Legal) Study Methods of Our Time: Vico Redux, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1303, 
1306 (2008) (pointing out that a rhetoric professor’s task “was to prepare students for the study of 
law”). 
 104. See JOSEPH, supra note 101, at 9 (stating that rhetoric “presupposes and makes use of 
grammar and logic”). 
 105. FROST, supra note 103, at 8. 
 106. See J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE ROMAN WORLD 3 (1995); KENNEDY, supra 
note 101, at 103.  According to Chaїm Perelman, the tradition necessarily persists to the current 
era, because “[l]egal reasoning is [only] a specific application of the theory of argumentation, a 
generalization of the Greco-Roman dialectic and rhetoric.”  PERELMAN, supra note 103, at 130. 
 107. Richard J. Schoeck, Lawyers and Rhetoric in Sixteenth-Century England, in 
RENAISSANCE ELOQUENCE: STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RENAISSANCE 
RHETORIC 274, 274 (James J. Murphy ed., 1983). 
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rather than in the Oxford colleges.108  Although the primary role of rhetoric in 
common-law trials receded before the rising tide of new procedures and 
evidentiary rules during the eighteenth century,109 the study of rhetoric 
remained a staple of secondary and collegiate education in England and 
America well into the nineteenth century.110  Hence, most British and 
American lawyers called to the bar between roughly 1750 and 1880 would 
have been well schooled in rhetoric.111   
When Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell’s Socratic case method of legal 
education triumphed in American law schools in the early twentieth century,112 
there was no place in the new Langdellian curriculum for a separate rhetoric 
course.113  For almost a century after its introduction in the 1870s, the Socratic 
case method114 was regarded as a highly efficient and successful means of 
teaching critical reasoning and argumentation skills, and applying them to 
difficult legal issues.115  Hence, it was widely believed that the Socratic case 
dialogue  adequately performed the same pedagogical task once accomplished 
through the teaching of logic and rhetoric.116   
B.  Legal Education Today: A Heritage Forgotten  
However, all is not well.  As previously discussed, law firms and judges 
persistently have complained that modern graduates cannot write and analyze 
                                                            
 108. Id. at 275. 
 109. FROST, supra note 103, at 11.  For historical treatments of these procedural changes, see 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 178–80 (2003); ALLYSON 
N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750–1850, at 176–201 (2003). 
 110. See FROST, supra note 103, at 12–13 (noting that classical rhetoric was “relegated to 
speech departments, rhetoric departments, and English departments” in nineteenth-century 
universities and that written discourse gained increased predominance over oral rhetoric); 
RICHARD, supra note 87, at 20 (stating that the trivium dominated European and American 
education into the nineteenth century). 
 111. Cf. FROST, supra note 103, at 10–13. 
 112. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN 
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 79, 99, 145, 168 (1994); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S at 36, 39 (1983); Susan Valdez 
Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial 
Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 511 (2003); Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law 
School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 331–32 (1979); Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: 
Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517, 540–43 (1991). 
 113. See, e.g., BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 213, 220, 226 (2009) (identifying law-school 
courses such as property, contracts, constitutional law, and wills); LAPIANA, supra note 112, at 
130 (noting that as Langdell’s successor as dean of Harvard Law School, James Barr Ames “was 
determined to exclude both nonlegal subjects and academics without law degrees from the law 
school”). 
 114. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Weaver, supra note 112, at 549–52; supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 116. Kerr, supra note 55, at 117. 
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adequately.117  In addition to reasons already examined, one major reason for 
the declining effectiveness of legal education is the disappearance of the 
Socratic case method from all stages of law-school instruction.118  Hence, now 
is the time for alert reformers to consider one solution, or, more precisely, one 
crucial component of any true solution: a return to the teaching of the trivium 
as part of the basic first-year substantive or doctrinal courses. 
C.  First-Semester 1Ls Need Cicero More than Laptops  
To alleviate the persistent complaints about graduates’ poor writing and 
reasoning talents, a logical first step is to teach and emphasize the cogent use 
and exposition of both speaking and writing during the first year of law 
school.119  Nothing could be more important for the development of crucial 
linguistic and “critical analysis” skills than prolonged instruction in rhetorical 
reasoning and discourse.120  As one professor remarked, 
[T]he principal problem with legal writing . . . is that we have not 
been taught how to create and construct arguments.  It is not our 
writing that is undeveloped or unclear; it is our thinking.  In order to 
develop “clearer” thinking, lawyers need to know something about 
the rhetorical tradition from which legal argument is derived.  Law 
students, in particular, should be acquainted explicitly with the basics 
of classical rhetoric: the different modes of persuasion, how to invent 
and construct arguments, how to identify fallacies in  
argument . . . .  [L]aw professors “should be teaching the sequences 
of logical reasoning.”121 
This rhetoric prescription makes perfect historical and pedagogical sense 
because “law is the very profession of rhetoric.”122  That is to say, law is a 
champ clos for the use of linguistic skill and logic to persuade legal decision 
                                                            
 117. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra Part III.E. 
 119. See Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. 
LEGAL. WRITING INST. 3, 11 (2010) (“Studying the law as rhetoric is essential to begin the 
complex task of legal interpretation.  Rhetoric also is essential for legal composition, perhaps 
even more naturally so because rhetoric is the historical site of the tools and implements of 
persuasion and argumentation.”). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal 
Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 489–90 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Anita Schnee, 
Logical Reasoning “Obviously,” 3 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 105, 116 (1997)). 
 122. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 
1554 (1990); see Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491, 572 (1998) (“Legal practice is rhetoric all the way down, with 
rhetorical engagements layered upon rhetorical engagements in a dynamic and challenging 
confluence that cannot be constrained by pretenses of analytical certainty.”); see also supra notes 
103–11 and accompanying text. 
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makers to favor an advocate’s position.123  In sum, law, both in its means and 
ends, is a deeply rhetorical endeavor.124   
This deep connection of law and rhetoric is so widely recognized today that 
there has never been a moment more propitious for teaching rhetoric during the 
first semester of law school.125  For instance, after noting that most law 
professors “stress the relevance and importance of rhetoric in law school 
instruction,” Professor Alan Watson asks rhetorically, “[W]hy not have a class 
or classes specifically on rhetoric?”126  Earlier in his monograph, however, 
Professor Watson provided good reasons why law schools should not teach 
rhetoric in a special class devoted specifically to that topic.127  These reasons 
appear in Watson’s account of his unhappy experience teaching professional 
responsibility when his school needed an emergency volunteer.128  In his 
words, “I have never been so miserable in my life.  I had to screw up my 
courage to enter the classroom.  The students hated the class.  It was not what 
they wanted.”129   
But why?  Although Watson’s reflections come from his experience 
teaching legal ethics, his answer is equally pertinent for an estimation of the 
likely effectiveness of a discrete first-year rhetoric course.  First, as Watson 
points out, professional responsibility is unlike the other required courses, 
which all focus on the substance of various commercial- and public-law 
topics.130  Second, although legal ethics calls for comparative and historical 
perspectives, the students “had no interest in wider perspectives.”131  These 
reasons for student resistance to studying legal ethics in a compulsory,  
stand-alone course apply with equal or greater force to a separate first-year 
rhetoric course. 
                                                            
 123. See BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND JUDGMENT 
174 (2006) (noting that rhetoric is integral to the deliberative process); see also PERELMAN, supra 
note 103, at 122 (commenting that the “best lawyers’ argument is the one which the judge uses in 
his own deliberations”). 
 124. See PERELMAN, supra note 103, at vii (“In actuality, these methods have long been put 
into practice by jurists.  Legal reasoning is fertile ground for the study of argumentation: it is to 
the new rhetoric what mathematics is to formal logic . . . .”); Vaughan, supra note 100, at 636–39. 
 125. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Editorial Introduction to THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1, 
3–4 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994); see also WATSON, supra note 15, at 20 
(noting that by the second year of law school, it is too late to teach students the introductory 
aspects of law). 
 126. WATSON, supra note 15, at 20 n.51. 
 127. See id. at xviii. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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D.  Professors Should Teach Legal Rhetoric in Core First-Year Courses: The 
Iowa Model for a More Effective Legal Analysis and Writing Program 
In addition to Watson’s experience with legal ethics, my own experience as 
a novice contracts professor at Texas Tech University School of Law in the 
late 1980s—especially in comparison with my later observations of the 
standard-model discrete Legal Research and Writing (LRW) course132—further 
informs my rejection of rhetoric as a separate course.  Texas Tech did not teach 
legal analysis and writing as a stand-alone course in the 1980s.  Instead, in 
harmony with the “Iowa approach,”133 legal reasoning and writing were 
                                                            
 132. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 21, at 77 (pointing out that in virtually all law 
schools, formal writing instruction takes place only in one first-year course separate from the 
doctrinal subjects). 
 133. As explained in Iowa Law School’s official history, 
[The School’s Curriculum Committee] proposed a first-year Small-Section Program in 
which every beginning student would take one first-year course in a small class taught 
by a full-time faculty member, and in which there would be special emphasis on the 
fundamental lawyer skills of legal analysis, research, and writing.  These small sections 
were placed in regular first-year subjects, the substance of which provided the content 
for the various skill-training exercises created and supervised by the faculty members 
teaching the courses. 
THE HISTORY OF THE IOWA LAW SCHOOL, 1865–2010, at 176 (N. William Hines ed., 2011); see 
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 
VAL. U. L. REV. 861, 861 n.1 (1995) (“The regular law faculties of the University of Iowa, 
Vanderbilt University, the University of Kansas, and the Dickinson School of Law teach writing 
through, and with, a substantive first-year course.”).  By the time Professor Leigh Hunt 
Greenhaw’s study was published in 1995, Texas Tech Law School had abandoned the Iowa 
approach some seven years earlier.  Surprisingly, in 2005, a decade after Greenhaw’s article 
appeared, the Iowa law faculty abandoned “the College’s signature contribution to reform in legal 
education” by eliminating the small-section writing program taught by the regular, full-time 
faculty and replaced it with a discrete first-year writing course taught by non-tenure-track 
professors.  THE HISTORY OF THE IOWA LAW SCHOOL, 1865–2010, supra, at 293–94.  The 
faculty overwhelmingly supported this change and apparently succumbed to the conventional 
“faculty fame” model of curricular reform.  See supra note 77–78; see also THE HISTORY OF THE 
IOWA LAW SCHOOL, 1865–2010, supra, at 293 (“In later years, some faculty chafed under the 
time commitment required by small-section teaching . . . .  [I]n 2004, the door was opened for 
faculty members who were disenchanted with the program to press openly for a more 
‘conventional’ and less faculty-intensive approach to teaching beginning students these basic 
skills.  It was argued that Iowa was out of step with the rest of the legal academy because in the 
21st century most other law schools relied on a staff of non-tenure-track professional-skills 
instructors to teach their first-year basic research and writing courses.  Other arguments . . . were 
that today’s entering students needed much greater instruction in analysis and writing than a 
generation ago, and that this necessitated teachers spending more time with students individually 
than it made sense for regular faculty members to commit.”). 
  Perhaps it is just as well that Iowa’s “regular faculty members” abandoned the important 
task of teaching reasoning and writing, given that its arguments for abandonment—ranging from 
blatantly self-interested pleading to the logical fallacy known as “Hume’s Guillotine”—would 
earn no better than a “C-minus” in any collegiate persuasive writing course.  For a brief 
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embedded and taught within the first-year doctrinal courses.  Therefore, the 
students learned basic analytical skills in a deeply contextualized, relevant 
fashion.   
This is not the case for students taught under the standard LRW model, 
which devalues legal analysis and writing by removing them from the “real” 
first-semester doctrinal courses, such as contracts, property, and torts, and 
depositing them in separate LRW courses.134  Moreover, untenured, full-time 
                                                                                                                                         
discussion of Hume’s Guillotine, see C. FRED ALFORD, NARRATIVE, NATURE, AND THE 
NATURAL LAW: FROM AQUINAS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 83–84 (2010). 
  Since 1989, Washington and Lee University School of Law has taught—and swims 
against the tide by continuing to teach—legal writing and analysis by the Iowa approach.  See 
Grunewald Interview, supra note 23, at 1; see also E-mail from Joan M. Shaughnessy, Professor 
of Law, Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Apr. 21, 2011, 14:17 EST) (on file with 
author).  The University of Baltimore School of Law also uses a modified Iowa approach to teach 
first-year legal reasoning and writing in small satellite courses connected to the first-year 
doctrinal courses and taught by the doctrinal-course professors, which is very similar to the Texas 
Tech Law School approach discussed later in this Article.  Compare infra note 145, with UNIV. 
OF BALT. SCH. OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOG, 2011–2012, at 
4–5, available at http://www.law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/20112012%20catalog%20 
final%206-29.pdf (“All . . . students will take either Introduction to Lawyering Skills 
(ILS)/Contracts I, ILS/Torts, ILS/Criminal Law or ILS/Civil Procedure I in their first semester.  
The ILS course [carries three credits and] will combine instruction on legal writing with a 
substantive course such as Criminal Law, Torts, Contracts I or Civil Procedure I.  The purpose of 
the ILS course is to teach legal writing skills within the context of a required first-year course.  
All students, regardless of the ILS course in which they are enrolled, will receive a similar legal 
writing experience.”).  Yale Law School has also used the Iowa approach’s basic features as the 
foundation for its first-year legal-writing program.  See Yale Law School Expands Legal Writing 
Instruction, YALE L. REP., Winter 2011, at 4 (discussing the recent changes to Yale’s “small 
group” writing program). 
 134. See Kissam, supra note 9, at 1989 (describing the devaluation of legal writing in law 
schools by highlighting that it is taught as a separate and distinct course, thus signaling that 
writing is a separate, less important skill than analytical skills taught in substantive courses using 
the case method); see also Dickerson, supra note 24, at 85 (concluding that law schools’ 
misunderstanding of the current problem and inadequacy in teaching legal writing “is reflected in 
the existence of courses called ‘Legal Research and Writing’”); Gross, supra note 22, at 266 
(lamenting that “[l]egal writing often is viewed as a separable and peripheral subject,” when 
instead it “is not less than the principal medium for the expression of, and hence for practice in, 
legal analysis”). 
  An assistant professor in the Legal Practice Program at the University of Michigan Law 
School correctly discerned that by teaching legal analysis and writing through the standard model 
of the stand-alone LRW course, students perceive the course as less important than their other 
substantive courses and, therefore, devote less attention to it.  Kenneth D. Chestek, Reality 
Programming Meets LRW: The Moot Case Approach to Teaching in the First Year, 38 GONZ. L. 
REV. 57, 58 (2002).  But Professor Kenneth Chestek’s solution is oblique.  Rather than endorsing 
the direct solution of obliterating the “anomaly” by teaching legal analysis and writing within 
those attention-getting “substantive” courses, Chestek believes the solution is “for the legal 
writing professor . . . to find a way to capture and retain the attention of first-year students.”  Id. at 
58–59.  Nevertheless, as Dean Grunewald, a veteran teacher of “the Iowa approach,” has noted, 
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instructors135 or, worse, short-term “fellows” who are only teaching LRW as a 
temporary way-station on the full-time, tenure-track career path are typically 
hired to staff these courses.136  Given these liabilities, it is not surprising to 
hear the common complaint that the students who learned legal analysis and 
writing in the standard-model LRW courses never “bridge the gap;”137 that is, 
they never make the connections between the reasoning skills taught 
(supposedly)138 in their LRW courses and the routine usage of these skills in 
                                                                                                                                         
law students are observant and may quickly discern that LRW instruction is less important than 
other courses if taught in a stand-alone course.  Grunewald Interview, supra note 23, at 1. 
 135. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 73, 74 (observing that “legal writing instructors are 
regarded as second-class citizens or not even as citizens but as helots” and that when students 
reminisce or talk about law school, they “seldom mention” legal-writing instructors).  One critic 
used the Hindu caste designation “untouchables” to describe the typical status of LRW faculty.  
Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 
70 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 118 (1997); see also Kissam, supra note 9, at 1990 (“The basic facts that 
most writing supervisors are not full-time professors and that the research and writing course 
‘typically carries less academic credit than any other first-year offering’ surely signal that writing 
is not to be taken as seriously as substantive law school courses.” (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Douglas E. Abrams, Integrating Legal Writing into Civil Procedure, 24 CONN. 
L. REV. 813, 817 (1992))); Mootz, supra note 84, at 1301 (“[T]he law school has banished 
rhetoric to a first year writing course that is too often taught by faculty who are regarded as less 
important than the research faculty.”). 
 136. My current institution combines the bad and worse alternatives of non-tenure track and 
part-time LRW teachers, as do many law schools that have a “Teaching Fellows” program for 
staffing the first-year LRW course.  At Loyola University (New Orleans) College of Law,  
non-tenure-track fellows, who also teach advanced electives and seminars, teach the  
first-semester LRW course, which thereby renders them “part-time” writing-and-analysis 
teachers.  That Loyola’s LRW course is the only course using 2Ls and 3Ls as teaching assistants 
further diminishes the status of Loyola’s LRW course.  Hence, as one perceptive Loyola student 
pointed out to me, the LRW course “is taught by assistants assisted by more assistants.” 
  Moreover, Loyola’s LRW fellows, like so many others in American law schools, have 
short-term appointments of one to three years.  Therefore, just as the LRW fellows are beginning 
to gain their sea legs, they ship out to full-time jobs elsewhere, and a whole new crew of novices 
is brought aboard to begin on-the-job self-training in the teaching of legal analysis and writing.  
Cf. Kissam, supra note 9, at 1990 (“Even when full-time [LRW] instructors are employed, they 
are often young lawyers . . . who are neither recognized nor paid as law professors and who 
experience rapid turnover.”).  For a summary of the findings of the 2002 Survey of Legal Writing 
Programs, jointly conducted by the Association of Legal Writing Directors and the Legal Writing 
Institute, in regard to the staffing of LRW courses, see Kristin B. Gerdy, Continuing 
Development: A Snapshot of Legal Research and Writing Programs Through the Lens of the 2002 
LWI and ALWD Survey, 9 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 227, 235 (2003) (stating that seventy-seven 
percent of the 154 school participants use full-time, non-tenure-track teachers who work under 
short-term employment contracts of one to five years). 
 137. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 80, at 384–85 (decrying the rise and dominance of the 
“skills/substance dichotomy” in law schools, which strictly distinguishes between skills courses 
and substantive courses); Greenhaw, supra note 133, at 863–67; see also infra note 141. 
 138. See Kate O’Neill, But Who Will Teach Legal Reasoning and Synthesis?, 4 J. ASS’N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 21, 30–31 (2007) (explaining that professors assigned to first-year 
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the students’ daily preparation for and participation in the substantive 
courses.139 
On the other hand, Texas Tech students had every reason to take analysis 
and writing seriously as skills to be used in their substantive courses because 
the course professors—presumably the faculty members most talented and 
experienced in teaching these core skills—taught legal reasoning and writing 
as a component of those courses.140  By teaching these as an integrated 
component of core courses, students made the connections between learning 
doctrine and analysis automatically.141  Thus, through instructional synergy, 
the school achieved a pedagogical integration that paid dividends in class, on 
final examinations, and presumably also later in upper-level courses.142  This 
spillover into the large-section classrooms occurs due to the basic psychology 
of confidence building through achievement: students who have achieved 
success in their small-section writing assignments are more likely to try the 
same successful rhetorical arguments and techniques again in different 
settings; therefore, the large classroom will be less likely to restrict student 
expression to pedestrian or obvious arguments.143  As a result, the  
end-of-semester blue books are more likely to contain analytically felicitous 
answers.144 
                                                                                                                                         
doctrinal courses no longer teach much about legal reasoning and largely rely on the legal-writing 
instructors to do the job). 
 139. See infra note 141. 
 140. See John A. Lynch, Teaching Legal Writing After a Thirty Year Respite: No Country for 
Old Men?, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (“Legal education’s doctrinal faculty unquestionably 
possess an enormous reservoir of legal writing talent.  Diverting at least some of this talent from 
law review articles and treatises would be great benefit to law students, who, after all, have 
purchased the services of these professors.”). 
 141. As Dean Grunewald remarked, one really cannot teach legal writing and analysis 
separate from legal substance, as proved by the content of legal-writing textbooks, which include 
case- and statute-based exercises.  Grunewald Interview, supra note 23, at 2.  But when writing 
and analysis are taught through those LRW textbooks in separate LRW courses, the instruction is 
disconnected from their daily, substantive learning, and the students thus miss the chance and 
incentive to apply their legal-writing and analysis skills on a regular basis, unlike the students 
taught under the Iowa approach. 
 142. In his discussion of the “Iowa approach,” Dean Grunewald referred to this educational 
synergy as “cross-fertilization,” arguing that the overlap of doctrinal studies and writing and 
analytical skill development will be mutually beneficial.  Id. at 3.  Unfortunately, as Professor 
Greenhaw has complained, very few schools integrate legal writing and substantive coursework. 
Greenhaw, supra note 133, at 861–62; see also Henderson, supra note 54, at 77 (criticizing 
contemporary law schools’ tendency “to teach skills [like analysis and writing] in separate 
courses from doctrine” and suggesting, for example, that “a course in contracts could include 
students’ drafting a contract for . . . [a hypothetical] client”). 
 143. Cf. James E. Moliterno, The Secret of Success: The Small-Section First-Year Skills 
Offering and Its Relationship to Independent Thinking, 55 MO. L. REV. 875, 881 (1990). 
 144. Id. 
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E.  The Logistics of a Modified Iowa Model  
The logistics of the modified Iowa model that I used while at Texas Tech in 
the 1980s145 were quite simple: a cohort of ten to twelve students in each  
first-semester course received two units of credit for separately meeting with 
one of their substantive-course professors an extra two hours per week to study 
legal analysis and writing.146  For example, during the first three weeks of the 
first semester, the criminal-law professor would use criminal attempt cases in 
the assigned casebook to teach case briefing and case synthesis to ten of her 
criminal-law students in two special reasoning-and-writing classes per week, 
whereas I used several of my contracts casebook’s “consideration” cases to 
teach those same analytical skills to a cohort of my contracts students.  At 
semester’s end, all students would receive two separately graded credit units in 
legal analysis and writing, with the final grade being based on the accumulated 
grades earned on the written exercises.   
As an added benefit of this modified Iowa approach, neophyte 1Ls were not 
thrown into the deep end of the basic first-semester study-techniques pool to 
sink or swim on their own.  For example, because they needed to read, brief, 
and synthesize all of the assigned cases in their core classes under professors’ 
supervision throughout the semester, students practiced these skills repeatedly 
during their first semester, which inculcates the importance of improving those 
                                                            
 145. Texas Tech’s version of the Iowa approach differed from the original in that there were 
no small sections of the basic first-year substantive courses.  The Iowa faculty taught writing and 
analysis in the regular class sessions of the small-section substantive courses, as does Washington 
and Lee School of Law.  See THE HISTORY OF THE IOWA LAW SCHOOL, 1865–2010, supra note 
133, at 252; Grunewald Interview, supra note 23, at 1.  In Texas Tech’s version, however,  
legal-reasoning-and-writing instruction took place in additional, specific class sessions devoted 
only to those skills, with a specific two-credit “line item” grade appearing on each student’s 
transcript to reflect his or her work in that course.  A moment’s reflection by anyone who has 
spent a decade or two in law-faculty lounges likely will reveal that Texas Tech’s variation is 
superior to Iowa’s approach: less opportunity for “gold-bricking.”  When the students and the 
professors have to spend an extra two hours per week in a course with a different catalogue name 
and number than the underlying substantive course, there will be less ability to give short shrift to 
the labor-intensive instruction in analysis and writing and to make up for that shortage by 
spending more time on case-law or doctrinal instruction in the substantive class sessions.  Such 
short shrifting and shifting would be easy to camouflage in the Iowa model.  Dean Grunewald’s 
observation that maintaining rough equality of effort and work among the various small “Iowa” 
sections is an ever-present, vexatious task for law deans at Washington and Lee confirmed this 
ease.  Id. at 3. 
 146. The perfectly sensible notion behind excluding research from the regimen is that novice 
law students need to know how to read critically, reason, and write before they can be expected to 
have any understanding or appreciation of the various research techniques and tools.  See Robert 
C. Berring & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Legal Research: Should Students Learn It or Wing It?, 81 
LAW LIBR. J. 431, 441 (1989) (maintaining that effective instruction of legal research can be best 
achieved in students’ second and third years of law school). 
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skills.147 Indeed, students improve and practice—even “over  
practice”148—these skills by receiving professors’ individualized written 
feedback, as well as through the general guidance provided through lecture and 
discussion in the separate weekly two-credit cohort class.149  Thus, unlike the 
standard-model students to whom I have taught contracts and torts since 
leaving Texas Tech School of Law, my Tech “cohort” 1Ls had no trouble 
transferring their legal analysis and writing skills to their substantive law 
classes because those skills had been taught, taught again, practiced, learned, 
and perfected as an integral part of studying and writing about the topics and 
cases covered in the substantive classes.150 
                                                            
 147. As “skills” teachers have noted, repetition of a professional skill not only develops and 
improves the skill but also embeds the skill as a habit, an implicit understanding of the skill so 
deep and instinctive that it can be used in different contexts.  See, e.g., David A. Binder & Paul 
Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 191, 200–01 (2003); 
James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 80–81 n.37 (1996). 
 148. See BORTINS, supra note 101, at 43–44. 
 149. Besides helping the students to correct and improve their analysis and writing, doctrinal 
professors’ tangible feedback will also help to alleviate one of the leading causes of law students’ 
diffidence and anxiety: not receiving periodic, concrete, individualized guidance from their 
professors, before final examinations, as to whether they are properly learning what needs to be 
learned.  See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 177–78; see also Paul Bateman, Toward 
Diversity in Teaching Methods in Law Schools: Five Suggestions from the Back Row, 17 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 397, 416 (1997) (emphasizing law students’ complaints about the lack of 
feedback throughout the semester).  Professor Paul Bateman argues that written assignments in 
first-year courses produce several benefits.  For example, stress about exams is lessened because 
they have “early and concrete” feedback on assignments during the course of the semester.  Id.  at 
416–17.  Additionally, a substantive-course teacher is able to learn from his or her students’ 
written assignments in which “students may have misunderstood material, which in turn enables 
the professor to correct misconceptions a class might have before the [final] exam.”  Id. at 417.  
This latter corrective benefit is but one specification of the general educational benefit described 
by Dean Grunewald as “cross-fertilization.”  See Grunewald Interview, supra note 23, at 3; see 
also Day, supra note 49, at 344–45 (recommending, as a better way to prepare students for bar 
examinations, that law faculties improve students’ analytical writing abilities by teaching students 
how to formulate solutions to old exam questions for every course and then provide feedback to 
students about their practice answers); Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Shailini Jandial George, 
Prompting In-Depth Analysis: A Three-Part Approach to Teaching Analogical Reasoning to 
Novice Legal Writers, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009) (“[S]tudents benefit from specific, 
constructive feedback as to how to fully develop a legal analysis . . . .”); Terri LeClercq, Principle 
4: Good Practice Gives Prompt Feedback, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 418, 418–21 (1999) (offering 
efficient ways for law professors to provide effective feedback). 
 150. See Binder & Bergman, supra note 147, at 202 (explaining that “feedback that provides 
students with the opportunity to revise their thinking as they work on tasks . . . is likely to be 
particularly effective”); Greenhaw, supra note 133, at 867 (arguing that, as key components of 
rhetoric, legal writing and substantive legal education should be learned together); Kissam, supra 
note 27, at 1987 (concluding that legal analysis and legal writing “should be integrated exercises 
in order that students will experience and understand the vital, often tacit interconnections 
between . . . the analysis of problems that often shifts as research and writing progresses, and the 
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F.  Educational Attributes of the Iowa Model (with a Comparison to the 
Standard-Model LRW Course)  
Such supervised repetition of reading, briefing, and case synthesis skills is 
crucial given both the basic “building block” nature of these skills151 and the 
daunting difficulty of these tasks for contemporary first-semester law 
students.152  Because these basic tasks are second nature for law professors, we 
easily forget how mystifying case briefing and synthesis and legal reasoning 
were for most of us as students.153  Indeed, the typical first-semester LRW 
class errs by trying to teach too much (library research, computer training, 
                                                                                                                                         
rethinking and rewriting of documents that so often informs effective research and analysis”); see 
also supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 492 (“To provide competent representation, a lawyer must 
communicate effectively.” (footnote omitted)); Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real 
Cases, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245, 245–46 (2011) (“[R]ule synthesis . . . has application throughout 
the law school experience. . . .  Rule synthesis has obvious utility for clinicians and others who 
supervise interns.  Mastering synthesis skills can help students integrate doctrinal material and 
succeed on law school exams.” (footnotes omitted)); Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law 
Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 474 (1993) (listing written 
and oral communication skills as the most important legal skills). 
 152. See CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 19 (6th ed. 2011) 
(explaining that first-semester 1Ls are typically mystified by judicial opinions on account of their 
unfamiliarity with legal terms and judicial methodology); Figley, supra note 151, at 246 
(commenting on the difficulty of understanding rule synthesis in the first year of law school); 
Hartung & George, supra note 149, at 691 (“[L]egal analysis can seem foreign and mysterious to 
first-year law students.”); Provenzano & Kagan, supra note 16, at 164 (noting that many 1Ls have 
great difficulty in grasping the theory and technique of case synthesis). 
 153. See Day, supra note 49, at 342 (maintaining that law professors must remember that the 
law is not intuitive for many law students and that they must patiently teach important doctrines 
without lowering expectations).  Perhaps one reason 2Ls and 3Ls are so reluctant to continue 
briefing cases (whether long-form or book-briefing) is that they learned neither how to do it well 
nor how to use their briefs during class dialogue.  One emeritus professor, who described a 
faculty meeting devoted to a discussion of that law school’s low pass rate on the state bar 
examination, describes one cause of this problem.  Barbara Taylor Mattis, Teaching Law: An 
Essay, 77 NEB. L. REV. 719, 722 n.3 (1998).  At this meeting, a student indicated that he only had 
to brief cases in one course because no other classes required it.  Id.  The student questioned 
whether the faculty was “challenging students as much as you used to, and if not, why not?”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
  One solution, as previously suggested, is for doctrinal-course professors to provide 
extensive written and oral feedback on their students’ case briefs.  See supra text notes 138–141 
and accompanying text.  One scholar observed that first-semester briefs are typically “either too 
long (the student has not recognized the material from the immaterial) or . . . too short (the 
student leaned . . . toward knowing only rules without a clue about their limits and peculiarities).”  
See Bateman, supra note 149, at 413.  Only the professor’s marginal blue-penciling of the case 
briefs and individual or small-group discussions can impart and explain the skill of properly 
constructing and proportioning case briefs.  These small-group discussions also convey to 
students that their case briefs will aid in their class participation and help them understand class 
discussions even if the professor is not questioning them.  Id. 
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style-sheet formatting, and Bluebook drills, among others),154 which thereby 
shortchanges the building-block skills and the repetition required for their 
mastery.155  Thus, in many versions of the standard-model LRW course, 
instructors spend little time (if any) on supervised case briefing, case synthesis, 
and hypothetical case solutions because instructors must have enough time to 
cover the course’s introduction-to-legal-research component and move on to 
the “real” assignments, such as writing opinion letters and memoranda.156  
                                                            
 154. See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 86 (“We have further demeaned legal writing by trying 
to crowd too much into single, elementary courses.”). 
 155. See Grant, supra note 80, at 394–95 (encouraging professors to assign writing 
assignments in substantive courses and to provide feedback to students on initial drafts).  One 
veteran law professor usefully analogized the acquisition of critical reading and analytical skills 
to learning how to ride a bicycle: 
[The] real learning of skills is accomplished experientially: one acquires problem-
solving skills only by attempting to perform them.  Knowing the issue and developing 
basic tools for analysis and problem-solving are much like learning to ride a bicycle.  
Quite simply, the skill of balancing a bike cannot be learned through books and lecture, 
or by observation.  Balancing on two wheels demands active participation.  One must 
attempt to ride without expectation of instantaneous success.  One must fall, get up, try 
again, get up, try again, and over time succeed.  One gets the hang of it only by actually 
doing it and, if necessary, doing it over and over and over again. 
David M. Becker, Some Concerns About the Future of Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 
474 (2001). 
  Another equally suggestive metaphor describing the experiential learning of the Socratic 
dialogue is the teeter-totter or seesaw.  This popular trope may be traced back to the encomium 
for a college professor revered by President James A. Garfield.  At an 1871 Williams College 
alumni banquet, Garfield honored his favorite teacher, Professor Mark Hopkins, by saying that he 
could think of no better educational experience than to have one-on-one interaction with the  
professor: “The ideal college,” Garfield declaimed, “is Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a 
student on the other.”  See JAMES R. DAVIS, BETTER TEACHING, MORE LEARNING: STRATEGIES 
FOR SUCCESS IN POSTSECONDARY SETTINGS 5 (1993). 
  Moreover, even John Dewey’s behaviorist educational theory proceeds from the 
fundamental tenet of “the experiential character of learning.”  Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with 
Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV.  609, 645–46, 661 (2007).  From 
this tenet, Professor Edward Rubin concludes that “[a] modern approach to legal education would 
integrate experiential learning into the regular educational program.  Every first-year course could 
have a skills component.”  Id. at 663.  The integrated Iowa approach, of course, provides one such 
component by teaching the legal reasoning and writing advocated by this Article.  See supra Part 
V.D–E. 
 156. See John A. Lynch, Jr., The New Legal Writing Pedagogy: Is Our Pride and Joy a 
Hobble?, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 231, 241–42 (2011) (discussing the memo as the set-piece of 
modern LRW classes).  My law school seems to be typical in its lack of programmatic attention 
to case briefing and synthesis.  At the beginning of their first semester, the LRW faculty assigns 
Loyola 1Ls to read and study the LRW textbook’s excerpts on briefing and synthesis; however, 
faculty never provides students with a how-to lecture, written critiques of their briefs, or graded 
assignments on these skills.  My school’s laissez vous faire approach to teaching these crucial 
gateway skills to legal analysis does not seem consistent with the ABA standard for teaching legal 
writing, which requires substantial instruction in “legal analysis and reasoning[,] . . . problem 
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Moreover, these “real” first-semester LRW assignments seem to be 
necessitated by the second semester or subsequent component of the typical 
LRW course, which is devoted to the appellate moot and brief.157 
A better approach would be to extend the first semester’s reasoning and 
analytical training to the second semester and place appellate work, as do some 
law schools, in the third semester.158  In this second semester of analysis, the 
writing assignments should gradually become longer and more complex—from 
the drafting of contracts or statutes, to opinion letters and office memoranda 
based on hypothetical problems from the assigned cases, to pre-trial briefs and 
proposed jury instructions for the same hypotheticals159—and at each step, 
these assignments solidify the core skills of legal analysis.  Of course, 
substantive-course professors should continue to teach these various  
second-semester writing assignments to small cohorts of students,160 and they 
                                                                                                                                         
solving, . . . [and] writing in a legal context.”  AM. BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR LAW SCHOOLS, 
supra note 23, § 302(a)(2)–(3). 
 157. See, e.g., Robert R. Stratchen, Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting Client 
Work Product in a Small Business Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 233, 238 (2011–2012) (noting 
the historic emphasis on appellate litigation in legal-writing courses); Bonny L. Tavares 
& Rebecca L. Scalio, Teaching After Dark: Part-Time Evening Students and the First-Year Legal 
Research & Writing Classroom, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 65, 95 n.133 (2011) (noting that the 
second-semester LRW focuses on trial and appellate briefs). 
 158. See Gerdy, supra note 136, at 237 (noting that according to the 2002 Survey of Legal 
Writing Programs, “[v]irtually all writing programs extend over [the] two semesters” of the  
first-year of law school).  However, as of 2003, more than thirty law schools added a required 
third semester in the fall of the 2L year.  Id. at 237, 240.  In 2007, the same survey disclosed that 
of the 173 participating law schools, 151 have a required “moot” or “advocacy” course in the first 
year, whereas twenty-three have a similar course required in the second year.  See PHIL FROST ET 
AL., ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS., LEGAL WRITING INST., 2007 SURVEY RESULTS 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.lwionline.org/survey/surveyresults2007.pdf. 
 159. See Grant, supra note 80, at 394 (recommending that doctrinal professors assign short 
writing exercises based on the various topics and issues in the doctrinal courses and stating that 
the professors’ written feedback would develop and support students’ ability to produce 
competent written analysis of legal issues); Kissam, supra note 9, at 1967–68; Philip C. Kissam, 
Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135, 164 (1987) (advocating for 
short writing assignments in doctrinal courses). 
 160. As one early proponent of using the problem method in substantive classes noted, “The 
intensity of the problem method and the development of skills that can result from its use require 
small classes for the sake of both teacher and student.”  Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method 
in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654, 664 (1984).  Foreign law professors who have 
studied the American system of legal education have remarked the labor-intensiveness of 
teaching with problems.  In discussing the problem method, to be distinguished from the case 
method in that any result or solution arose not from the focused discussion of cases but instead 
“had to be developed by the students [before class] on the basis of the assigned materials,” 
Professor Pnina Lahav concluded that this method requires “intense work on the part of both 
teachers and students.” Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How, and Why Did Israeli 
Law Faculties Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 653, 675 
(2009).  Students also have remarked the augmented labor demands of the problem method.  See 
James Eagar, Comment, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in 
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should base these writing exercises and problems on the course’s topics and 
materials.161  Again, the resulting synergy will permit students to learn the 
doctrinal content of their substantive classes more efficiently while 
simultaneously strengthening their writing, reasoning, and problem-solving 
skills.162   
An additional benefit of the modified Iowa approach is that the Socratic 
instruction in the substantive classes will be energized by the cohort students 
who have learned the assigned cases thoroughly enough to synthesize their 
doctrines and apply them to the hypothetical problems in the writing 
assignments.163  Thus, the cohort students will be improving their case-method 
thinking skills as they work on those writing assignments, and these improved 
skills will enrich the Socratic classroom dialogue.164  Once again, too, another 
semester of integrated pedagogy overcomes the artificial distinction between 
the substantive courses’ content and the stand-alone LRW course’s legal 
analysis and writing, all to the betterment of the student’s basic mastery of 
doctrine, reasoning, and writing.165  Moreover, this Iowa approach fosters the 
                                                                                                                                         
Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389, 405 (1996–1997) (noting that “students must often take 
more time to prepare [for class] when the problem method is used” (footnote omitted)). 
 161. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.  An additional benefit for first-semester 
students in an Iowa-approach program is that they will have practiced, in writing and with 
professorial feedback, the sort of comprehension and application of material facts to solve  
core-course problems that standard-model 1Ls do not deal with until the first set of final 
examinations.  See Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does 
Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay 
Exam Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 286–300 (2008) (describing success in 
improving 1L students’ legal analysis and writing skills through a series of writing exercises 
accompanied by professorial feedback); Joseph C. Dimperio, Some Reflections on Teaching the 
Law: Better Lawyers from Better Law School Instruction, JURIS, Fall 1996, at 14, 15 (“For most 
students, the [first-semester final] examination is too late to deal with the comprehension and 
application of content for the first time.”). 
 163. This additional benefit is, of course, another instance of “cross-fertilization.”  See supra 
notes 15–16. 
 164. See Lisa T. McElroy, From Grimm to Glory: Simulated Oral Argument as a Component 
of Legal Education’s Signature Pedagogy, 84 IND. L.J. 589, 596–98 (2009) (explaining that using 
skills exercises in “the doctrinal classroom would benefit students in all the ways suggested by 
the [Carnegie and Best Practices] Reports” by connecting thought and action, thereby preparing 
the student mind for practice).  Dean Grunewald explains that in the doctrinal classroom, he is 
able to focus Socratically on students who need extra practice in framing arguments or analyzing 
cases because he knows their weaknesses from reading their written exercises.  See Grunewald 
Interview, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
 165. It is heartening that other law professors also have lamented the standard-model’s 
disjoining effect of separating instruction in legal reasoning and writing from instruction in 
substantive doctrine.  See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
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precise integration of skills and doctrinal teaching recommended by the most 
recent Carnegie Report on the improvement of legal education.166 
Having the cohort students conduct simulated oral arguments based on their 
writing problems further energizes the substantive-course classroom.167  The 
problems, of course, should be based on casebook cases and topics, which will 
permit every student in the course to follow and learn from the oral arguments.  
Then, after a few demonstrations by the cohort students, other members of the 
class can be assigned oral-argument exercises also based on the casebook 
materials.168  This teaching mechanism dismantles the learning barriers 
fostered by the separate LRW class because by using “simulated  
oral argument exercises in the doctrinal classroom, . . . professors can directly 
relate analytic learning objectives to practical lawyering skills.”169 
Finally, and encouragingly, law professors today enjoy a wealth of 
instructional materials and books adapted170 or  
                                                            
 166. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13 (“[W]e propose an integration of student 
learning of theoretical and practical legal knowledge and professional identity.”); see also 
Kloppenberg, supra note 16, at 1099–1102 (explaining that the University of Dayton Law 
School’s new “Lawyer as Problem Solver” curriculum features a “more comprehensive 
integration of lawyering skills” within the foundational doctrinal courses, an “approach [that] 
reflects many of [the Carnegie Report’s] themes”). 
 167. See McElroy, supra note 164, at 593.  An additional benefit of classroom oral 
arguments, as Professor Lisa McElroy recognizes, is that much like the writing exercises in the 
cohort approach, oral exercises compel students to overcome any tendency to differentiate 
between the study and practice of legal analysis and the case method of learning substantive law.  
See id. at 595, 599. 
 168. For useful ideas about designing oral-argument exercises and problems for the first-year 
classroom, see Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 470 
(1995) (describing a range of classroom simulations); Jonathan M. Hyman, Discovery and 
Invention: The NITA Method in the Contracts Classroom, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 759  
& n.1 (1991) (explaining the use of simulations in a first-year contracts curriculum); McElroy, 
supra note 164, at 607 (noting that simulated oral arguments require an application of rules to the 
narrative framework); Myron Moskovitz, From Case Method to Problem Method: The Evolution 
of a Teacher, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1205, 1209–13 (2004) (outlining an example of a problem 
method hypothetical). 
 169. McElroy, supra note 164, at 599; see also James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: 
Once More into the Cave, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003) (arguing that role playing can 
further the Socratic method’s impact); Becker, supra note 155, at 475 (“The problem method 
really involves the same [analytical process] as the case method, only it is more advanced.  It 
focuses on the application of the law—cases, statutes, etc.—within the context of a specific 
problem and its solution. . . . Indeed, the problem method achieves what teachers of the case 
method frequently try to accomplish with their hypothetical questions.”); McElroy, supra note 
164, at 603 (concluding that “a simulated oral argument achieves all of the same objectives as the 
Socratic method”). 
 170. See generally, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL 
REASONING (3d ed. 2007); CALLEROS, supra note 152; LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: 
PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 2010); WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF 
LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d ed. 2008); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL 
WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE (6th ed. 2009); KRISTEN KONRAD  
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adaptable171 to teaching rhetorical discourse and reasoning in first-year law 
courses.172  This abundance of materials did not exist even forty years ago.173  
The authors of these instructional materials have discerned and plumbed the 
deep connections between legal analysis and rhetoric,174 and in doing so, they 
have done much of the necessary spadework for the law schools and faculties 
using the Iowa approach and thus embedding legal reasoning and writing 
instruction within the first-year doctrinal courses.175  Most important of all, 
                                                                                                                                         
ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS 
AND PERSUASION (2009); DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL 
ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL (2d ed. 2009); PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID SKOVER, 
TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING (1986); HELEN S. SHAPO, MARILYN R. WALTER & ELIZABETH 
FAJANS, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW (5th ed. 2008); MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED 
LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (2d ed. 2008). 
 171. See, e.g., CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 101; JOSEPH, supra note 101; CHAЇM 
PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 
(John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969); STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF 
ARGUMENT: UPDATED EDITION (2003); RICHARD M. WEAVER, A RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION 
HANDBOOK (William Morrow & Co. rev. 1974) (1957); ANTHONY WESTON, A RULEBOOK FOR 
ARGUMENTS (4th ed. 2009). 
 172. For an excellent annotated bibliography of monographs and essays about rhetoric and 
law, see Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. 
ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129 (2006). 
 173. A comparison of the 2010 and the 1970 catalogues of Foundation Press, Inc. (one of the 
two major law-book publishers then and now) discloses a three-fold increase in legal analysis and 
writing titles over the past forty years.  See Telephone Interview by Shan Jiang with Paul 
Thomson, Senior Account Manager, Found. Press (Mar. 31, 2011) (“There were four books with 
the title of legal research and writing published [by Foundation Press] in the 1970s.  By 
comparison there are 12 books with the same titles published [by Foundation] in 2009–2010.”). 
 174. See J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric 
of Legal Reason, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211, 214 (Peter 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 
1089, 1094 (1986); see also James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of 
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (explaining that “law is most 
usefully seen not . . . as a system of rules, but as a branch of rhetoric”). 
 175. As a preventive first strike against the predictable criticisms that my call for the 
widespread adoption of the Iowa model is hopelessly naïve, let me record here that as a  
twenty-five-year veteran of largely unproductive, dispiriting curriculum reform faculty meetings, 
I have regularly dipped into the relevant literature for its palliative message that the obstacles to 
and failures of curricular-reform mark all law schools, no matter what U.S. News & World Report 
niche they inhabit.  See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Change, the Law, and Curriculum Reform, 
45 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 979 (1996) (“The conventional reasons [for the lack of curricular reform] 
that affect other academic departments and institutions apply [in law schools] as well.”); Steven 
C. Bennett, When Will Law School Change?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 87, 103–07 (2010) (noting a 
variety of reasons for law schools’ resistance to change “[d]espite long-standing recognition of 
the need for reform of legal education”); John C. Weistart, The Law School Curriculum: The 
Process of Reform, 1987 DUKE L.J. 317, 329–36 (noting the inherent institutional limits on 
attempts to reform the law-school curriculum).  Thus, I harbor no naïve, optimistic expectations 
for a widespread shift to the Iowa approach, but I do confess to a stubborn professionalism that 
avows the duty of a doctor to write the prescription even when the patient refuses the cure. 
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perhaps, this curricular choice will teach law students how justice can be 
achieved through the rhetorical arts of rational persuasion,176 while at the same 
time rendering them the justice of the education they—and their future 
































                                                            
 176. See Berger, supra note 119, at 8–9 (“Rhetoric recognizes a constructive role for law 
students and lawyers by acknowledging that the law is often being interpreted and that 
interpretations are often contestable.  From the rhetorical point of view, law students, law 
teachers, and lawyers are human actors whose work makes a difference because they are the 
readers, writers, and members of interpretive and compositional communities who together 
‘constitute’ the law.”). 
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